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ABSTRACT
Marketing partnerships may involve either horizontal relationships (e.g., a co-marketing
alliance between firms selling different products) or vertical relationships (e.g., between an
upstream manufacturer and its downstream retailers). Either type of partnership often
includes multiple members and the marketing efforts (e.g., level of advertising) of any member
typically affect the profitability of the other members. When selecting their effort levels,
however, the individual members of the partnership do not account for such externalities.
Consequently, the overall effort on behalf of the partnership is not optimal. This dissertation
investigates the value of contractual mechanisms such as monitoring schemes (for horizontal
partnerships) and cooperative advertising programs (for vertical partnerships) that may
provide better incentives to the partners to invest into the relationship.
The first part of this dissertation focuses on horizontal marketing partnerships and ex-
amines the relative effectiveness of outcome- and action-based contracts in providing the
alliance partners with the incentives to invest appropriately. A mathematical model is de-
veloped in which a focal firm (e.g., Sony) contracts with two partners (e.g., McDonald’s
and Old Navy), when each of these partners is privately informed about the impact of the
alliance on its demand. The analysis evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of outcome-
(or output-) and action- (or input-) based contracts in several settings including those with
no demand externality, a positive externality and a negative externality. The analysis shows
that when there is (a) no externality, (b) negative externality, or (c) a relatively weak positive
externality, there is a strict preference for output-based contracts; that preference, however,
is reversed with a sufficiently strong positive externality. The rationale for these findings,
along with the implications and directions for further work are discussed.
The second part of this dissertation focuses on a vertical marketing relationship where
multiple retailers sell the products from a common manufacturer. Here, each retailer’s level
of advertising affects the demand for the other retailers. This positive externality, however,
iii
allows any retailer to free-ride on the other retailers’ efforts and leads to an overall reduction
in the level of advertising by all the retailers. In this context, a manufacturer can use a
cooperative advertising contract to reimburse part of the advertising expenses of its retailers
in order to induce them to raise their levels of advertising. Observed terms in a cooperative
advertising contract include either a participation rate, a participation rate and a variable
accrual rate, or a participation rate and a fixed accrual rate. This dissertation analyzes
the relative effectiveness of the above three types of cooperative advertising contracts in
minimizing or eliminating the free-riding problem.
More specifically, a mathematical model is developed to analyze the relative impact of
these contractual terms when the downstream retailers face either symmetric or asymmetric
demand and cost structures. The analysis shows that with symmetric retailers, the three
types of contracts are equally effective. With asymmetric retailers, though, including some
form of accrual stipulations typically adds value to a contract that specifies only a participa-
tion rate. Further, using a variable accrual stipulation may be preferred to the fixed accrual
stipulation under certain conditions and vice versa. The two types of accrual stipulations
affect retail prices and efforts in distinct ways and these differences may tip the scale in favor
of one contract versus the other under the appropriate circumstances. These conditions and
the intuition behind the results are discussed. Overall, this dissertation contributes to the
literature on horizontal and vertical marketing relationships and enhances our understand-
ing of distinct contractual mechanisms that can help align the actions of various members
involved in such partnerships.
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Marketing partnerships may involve either horizontal relationships (e.g., a co-marketing
alliance between firms selling different products) or vertical relationships (e.g., between an
upstream manufacturer and its downstream retailers). Either type of partnership often
includes multiple members and the marketing efforts (e.g., level of advertising) of any member
typically affect the profitability of the other members. When selecting their effort levels,
however, the individual members of the partnership do not account for such externalities.
Consequently, the overall effort on behalf of the partnership is not optimal. This dissertation
investigates the value of contractual mechanisms such as monitoring schemes (for horizontal
partnerships) and cooperative advertising programs (for vertical partnerships) that may
provide better incentives to the partners to invest into the relationship.
The first part of this dissertation analyzes contractual issues in horizontal marketing
partnerships and the second part analyzes vertical partnerships. In the next few paragraphs,
the relevant issues pertaining to horizontal partnerships, the contribution to the extant liter-
ature, the results of this work and the corresponding intuition are introduced. Subsequently,
analogous issues dealing with vertical marketing partnerships are introduced.
Co-marketing alliances, such as those between Sony Pictures and Old Navy, or between
Disney and McDonald’s, aim to enhance the value of partner firms’ offerings to consumers.
In the Disney-McDonald’s alliance, for instance, McDonald’s was contractually required to
spend around $20 million a year on promoting Disney’s movies along with the McDonald’s
Happy Meal1; and Disney received licensing fees to the tune of $100 million per year (for ten
years) for granting the right to use its characters as part of the promotion.
1As a part of this promotion, Disney-movie-character toys are given to consumers who purchase a
McDonald’s-Happy-Meal, and the popularity of the movie raises the effectiveness of McDonald’s promo-
tion (Howard 1996).
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Co-marketing alliances typically involve multiple partners —for example, Sony formed
alliances with McDonald’s, Old Navy, ConAgra Foods and many other partners to promote
the movie Surf’s Up. In such alliances, each partner’s marketing actions are likely to affect
the outcomes generated by the other partners. For instance, Old Navy’s efforts to promote
Surf’s Up can raise the awareness/popularity of the movie; since McDonald’s sales are also
linked to the movie’s success, Old Navy’s promotional investments can indirectly benefit
the sales of McDonald’s products. The individual partners of an alliance typically do not
consider the impact of such indirect linkages while deciding on their levels of investment;
this can lead to an overall under-investment in marketing efforts2 (for a discussion of this
under-investment problem in other contexts see, e.g., Lal 1990, Amaldoss et al 2000) and can
lower the value of the alliance. Therefore, it is useful to understand the relative strengths
of different types of contractual agreements in providing the appropriate incentives to the
partners to increase their marketing efforts. Hence, the first part of this dissertation examines
the relative effectiveness of outcome- and action-based contracts in providing the alliance
partners with the incentives to invest appropriately in marketing efforts.
Extant research on co-marketing alliances has focused primarily on issues such as the
firms’ motivation for forming these partnerships (e.g., Rao et al 1999, Rao and Ruekert
1994), selecting suitable alliance partners (Venkatesh and Mahajan 1997) and identifying
factors that lead to a successful alliance (Venkatesh et al 2000, Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).
While this stream of work has generated valuable insights, little research attention has been
devoted to understanding the relative effectiveness of alternative contractual agreements on
the performance of co-marketing alliances. This dissertation contributes to the literature
by focusing on co-marketing alliances involving multiple partners and compares alternative
contractual mechanisms in their effectiveness to induce appropriate marketing investments.
2Hereafter, we use the term “effort” to refer to include marketing actions such as promoting the alliance
or investing in advertising.
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Many factors affect the terms of the contracts employed in a co-marketing alliance and the
optimal contract will likely require a careful resolution of several important tradeoffs. Here,
the focus is on the impact of information asymmetry. In the Sony-McDonald’s alliance,
for example, compared to Sony, McDonald’s is likely to have better information on how
customers in the fast food business react to promotions and therefore can more accurately
estimate the benefit (e.g., the boost in demand) it would receive from the alliance. Such
information-asymmetry issues will likely arise between Sony and the other alliance partners
as well, and can affect how the partners share any surplus arising out of the alliance.
In practice, contracts are often made contingent on one or more performance criteria,
and when information asymmetry is a principal feature of the market setting, extant litera-
ture (e.g., Basu et al 1985, Maskin and Riley 1985, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Khalil and
Lawarree 1995, Raju and Srinivasan 1996, Desiraju and Moorthy 1997, Mishra and Prasad
2004) suggests that varying the performance-criterion can alter the partners’ incentives to
exert effort. Accordingly, chapter 2’s goal is to compare the relative merits of two types of
agreements: those contingent on (1) the partner’s marketing actions (e.g., level of Happy
Meal promotions by McDonald’s) and (2) the partner’s outcomes (e.g., sales levels of Happy
Meals). In this comparison, the interest is in the role played by any demand linkage or
externality that exists among the partners.
In the absence of any demand externality, when contracting with an asymmetrically
informed partner (or agent), Khalil and Lawarree (1995) (KL) demonstrate that contracts
based on outputs generate superior returns to the principal. The logic underlying KL’s result
is as follows: Suppose the agent were a residual claimant—as is typically the case in any co-
marketing alliance—and the contract were contingent on monitored outputs (KL refer to this
setup as output monitoring). In such settings, the agent has discretion over the level of effort
expended on behalf of the partnership (this feature is noted in the many analyses of agency
relationships studied in marketing). Now, by contrast, suppose that inputs are contracted
upon. In such a setting (aka input monitoring), if an agent in a more productive state of
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nature were to claim to be in a less productive state, then by virtue of being the residual
claimant, that agent can appropriate some of the output generated from the alliance without
sharing it with the principal (since the output is not monitored). This additional output
that the agent can pocket under input monitoring serves as a deciding factor in arriving at
KL’s main finding that the principal prefers monitoring the agent’s output rather than the
level of effort. Interestingly, though, anecdotal evidence suggests that the contractual terms
between partners in a co-marketing alliance are typically based on marketing actions rather
than on marketing outcomes: As noted earlier, in its alliance with Disney, McDonald’s was
contractually required to invest in promoting the partnership while paying Disney a fee for
the right to use its characters. Since such terms seem counter to the findings in KL, the goal
here is to explore when such contracts may be preferred.
Accordingly, chapter 2 builds on KL’s adverse selection setting and develop a simple
multiple agent model—in which a focal firm contracts with two privately informed partners—
to identify when a contract contingent on inputs may be preferred over an output-based
contract. The analysis reveals that the nature of the demand externality among the alliance
partners plays a critical role in the choice between these two contract forms. Intuitively, as
in the single agent setting, when only the outputs are monitored, agents have an opportunity
to limit the efforts put forth on behalf of the alliance. Further, the presence of a positive
demand externality in the multi-agent setting tends to result in even lower effort levels than
in the single agent setting. As the strength of the positive demand externality goes up, the
multiple agents’ effort levels shrink to correspondingly lower levels, and the principal’s losses
(along with those of the alliance) to correspondingly higher levels.
In contrast, by monitoring inputs, the principal effectively raises the effort (or marketing
investment) levels that the multiple agents put forth. The positive demand externality,
in turn, generates more output; since the partners are residual claimants, and the principal
only monitors inputs, there is more output that can be appropriated by the partners without
sharing it with the principal. At lower strengths of the positive externality, the principal
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continues to prefer output monitoring as noted in KL. When the positive demand externality
is sufficiently strong, however, the lower effort levels induced under output monitoring can
prove to be too costly for the principal; and input monitoring becomes the preferred contract
form. Chapter 2 develops and analyzes a mathematical model and present more precise
conditions (involving either a positive or a negative externality) where one type of contract
may be preferred over the other. Chapter 2 also highlights the conditions under which the
effort levels under one type of contract dominate those in the other type of contract. By
evaluating the relative effectiveness of alternative contractual terms, the analysis adds to
both the co-marketing alliance literature as well as to the agency literature dealing with
monitoring issues in adverse selection settings.
The second part of this dissertation focuses on a vertical marketing partnership where
multiple retailers sell the products from a common manufacturer. Here, each retailer’s level
of advertising affects the demand for the other retailers. This positive externality, however,
allows any retailer to free-ride on the other retailers’ efforts and leads to an overall reduction
in the levels of advertising by all the retailers. In this context, a manufacturer can use a
cooperative advertising contract to reimburse part of the advertising expenses of its retailers
in order to induce them to raise their levels of advertising. Observed terms in a cooperative
advertising contract include either a participation rate, a participation rate and a variable
accrual rate, or a participation rate and a fixed accrual rate. This dissertation analyzes
the relative effectiveness of the above three types of cooperative advertising contracts in
minimizing or eliminating the free-riding problem.
While all cooperative advertising contracts offer to reimburse a portion (called the partic-
ipation rate) of the retailer’s advertising expenses, many of these contracts also specify limits
(called the accrual rate) on the total reimbursement offered. These accrual rates are either
set as a fraction of wholesale receipts from the retailer or are simply set as a fixed dollar
amount. While extant research (Bergen and John 1997, Huang et al 2002, He et al 2007) in
this area has focused only on the participation rate, there is no research that investigates the
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impact of the two accrual rates on retail behavior. Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation fill
this gap in the literature and investigate the use of the cooperative advertising participation
rate and the two types of accrual rates in their effectiveness to provide the retailers with
appropriate incentives to increase their levels of advertising.
Chapter 3 considers a manufacturer selling its products through two symmetric indepen-
dent retailers. The retailers face positive advertising externalities and in the absence of any
cooperative advertising contract, under-invest in advertising. The analysis shows that the
manufacturer can use a cooperative advertising contract that includes only a single partici-
pation rate offered to both the retailers to increase the overall levels of advertising. When
the manufacturer offers the retailers a cooperative advertising contract that reimburses part
of their advertising expenses (participation rate contract), the retailer’s marginal cost of
advertising is lowered and they find it attractive to increase their investments in advertising.
The manufacturer can choose the participation rate such that the retailers increase their
advertising levels to that preferred by the manufacturer. Hence, the manufacturer uses the
participation rate to align the interests of the retailers with those of the channel. The op-
timal participation rate required to align the retailers’ interest with that of the channel are
derived for a general demand structure, without making specific assumptions regarding the
functional form of the demand faced by the retailers. Hence, this provides a useful analytical
tool to determine the participation rates in a variety of settings.
Next, the analysis shows that the manufacturer can also achieve coordination in the
channel by using a combination of the participation rate and either of the two types of
accrual rates. When the manufacturer uses an accrual rate in addition to the participation
rate, the manufacturer can set the participation rates at higher levels than that required
to coordinate the channel under the participation rate contract. This provides the retailers
with an incentive to increase their advertising levels by a greater amount than under a single
participation rate contract. The manufacturer then limits the total reimbursement to the
retailers by using an accrual rate that is either a fixed amount or a fraction of the wholesale
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receipts from the retailer. While the retailers have an incentive to increase advertising to
levels beyond what is sufficient to coordinate the channel, the manufacturer uses the cap on
reimbursement to limit the retailer’s advertising to the channel coordinating levels. Hence,
the manufacturer can use both the participation rate and the accrual rate to achieve the
same result achieved through the use of a participation rate alone.
While the two types of accrual rates can help coordinate the advertising levels in the
distribution channel, each type of accrual rate has a unique impact on retail prices and
advertising levels. The accrual rate that is set as a fixed amount has a positive impact on
retail prices. As the manufacturer increases the fixed cap, retailers tend to increase prices.
Since the increases in the fixed cap induce the retailers to increase their advertising levels,
the increase in the advertising levels in turn leads the retailers to increase retail prices. While
this indirect impact of the increase in advertising levels on retail prices also exits when the
manufacturer uses an accrual rate linked to wholesale receipts, the increase in the accrual
rate also has a negative direct impact on retail prices.
When the manufacturer uses an accrual rate linked to wholesale receipts, unlike the
fixed accrual rate scenario, the retailers can influence the cap on reimbursements through
their choices of price and effort levels. As retailers decrease prices (or increase effort), retail
demand goes up and in turn the wholesale receipts go up. This leads to an increase in the
cap on cooperative advertising reimbursements. Hence, as the manufacturer increases the
accrual rate linked to wholesale receipts, the retailers may find it attractive to decrease retail
prices and thereby further increase the cap on reimbursements. As the accrual rate increases,
the increase in the cap for a unit decrease in retail prices is higher (compared to when the
accrual rate is lower). Hence, the net effect of an increase in accrual rate linked to wholesale
receipts may lead to a reduction in retail prices as opposed to an increase in retail prices
(that occurs under the fixed accrual rate contract).
While chapter 3 investigates the use of various cooperative advertising contracts by a
manufacturer selling through two symmetric retailers, downstream retailer asymmetry is
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likely to arise when selling to multiple retailers who differentiate themselves from each other.
Retailer asymmetry can also arise due to differences in cost structures. In addition, retailers
may also differ in their target customer segments’ size and/or valuations of the products sold
and these segment differences may result in the retailers facing asymmetric demand. As Iyer
(1998) notes, retail differentiation has important implications for upstream manufacturers
and the extant literature seldom accounts for such asymmetry in investigating channel issues.
The use of a ‘one size fits all’ strategy that works well under symmetry may fail under
asymmetry. Hence, chapter 4 extends the analysis in chapter 3 to investigate the effectiveness
of cooperative advertising contracts in coordinating the channel in the presence of asymmetric
downstream retailers.
With asymmetric retailers, while all three types of contracts can coordinate the channel
under very stringent conditions, contracts that include some form of accrual stipulation
can coordinate the channel under less stringent conditions compared to the contract that
includes only a participation rate. When the cooperative advertising contract includes an
accrual stipulation, the manufacturer can use the accrual amount to coordinate the efforts
of one retailer while using the participation rate to coordinate the other retailer’s efforts.
Further, using a variable accrual stipulation may be preferred to the fixed accrual stipulation
under certain conditions and vice versa. The two types of accrual stipulations affect retail
prices and efforts in distinct ways and these differences may tip the scale in favor of one
contract versus the other contract under the appropriate circumstances. These conditions
and the intuition behind the results are discussed.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the literature on horizontal and vertical marketing
relationships and enhances our understanding of distinct contractual mechanisms that can
help align the actions of various members involved in such partnerships.
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CHAPTER 2: CO-MARKETING ALLIANCES
2.1 Introduction
Co-marketing alliances, such as those between Sony Pictures and Old Navy, or between
Disney and McDonald’s, are growing in popularity and involve considerable sums of money
(Ebenkamp 2007). These alliances aim to enhance the value of partner firms’ offerings to
consumers, and a notable feature is that these partnerships are governed mainly by contrac-
tual agreements (see e.g., Bucklin and Sengupta 1993, Venkatesh et al 2000, Simonin and
Ruth 1998). In the Disney-McDonald’s alliance, for instance, McDonald’s was contractually
required to spend around $20 million a year on promoting Disney’s movies along with the
McDonald’s Happy Meal1; and Disney received licensing fees to the tune of $100 million per
year (for ten years) for granting the right to use its characters as part of the promotion.
Extant research on co-marketing alliances has focused primarily on issues such as the
firms’ motivation for forming these partnerships (e.g., Rao et al 1999, Rao and Ruekert
1994), selecting suitable alliance partners (Venkatesh and Mahajan 1997) and identifying
factors that lead to a successful alliance (Venkatesh et al 2000, Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).
While this stream of work has generated valuable insights, little research attention has been
devoted to understanding the relative effectiveness of alternative contractual agreements on
the performance of co-marketing alliances. An exception is the work by Amaldoss et al
(2000) which examines, in the context of R&D alliances, how a partner’s investments in
new product development depend on the terms of the contract—they consider equal versus
proportional profit sharing agreements.
1As a part of this promotion, Disney-movie-character toys are given to consumers who purchase a
McDonald’s-Happy-Meal, and the popularity of the movie raises the effectiveness of McDonald’s promo-
tion (Howard 1996).
9
We add to this literature by focusing on co-marketing alliances in which there are multiple
partners—e.g., Sony formed alliances with McDonald’s, Old Navy, ConAgra Foods and many
other partners to promote the movie Surf’s Up. In such alliances, each partner’s marketing
actions are likely to affect the outcomes generated by the other partners. For instance, Old
Navy’s efforts to promote Surf’s Up can raise the awareness/popularity of the movie; since
McDonald’s sales are also linked to the movie’s success, Old Navy’s promotional investments
can indirectly benefit the sales of McDonald’s products. The individual partners of an
alliance typically do not consider the impact of such indirect linkages while deciding on their
levels of investment; this can lead to an overall under-investment in marketing efforts2 (for a
discussion of this under-investment problem in other contexts see, e.g., Lal 1990, Amaldoss
et al 2000) and can lower the value of the alliance. Therefore, it is useful to understand the
relative strengths of different types of contractual agreements in providing the appropriate
incentives to the partners.
Many factors affect the terms of the contracts employed in a co-marketing alliance and
the optimal contract will likely require a careful resolution of several important tradeoffs.
Here, we focus on the impact of information asymmetry. In the Sony-McDonald’s alliance,
for example, compared to Sony, McDonald’s is likely to have better information on how
customers in the fast food business react to promotions and therefore can more accurately
estimate the benefit (e.g., the boost in demand) it would receive from the alliance. Such
information-asymmetry issues will likely arise between Sony and the other alliance partners
as well, and can affect how the partners share any surplus arising out of the alliance.
In practice, contracts are often made contingent on one or more performance criteria,
and when information asymmetry is a principal feature of the market setting, extant litera-
ture (e.g., Basu et al 1985, Maskin and Riley 1985, Desai and Srinivasan 1995, Khalil and
Lawarree 1995, Raju and Srinivasan 1996, Mishra and Prasad 2004) suggests that varying
2Hereafter, we use the term “effort” to refer to include marketing actions such as promoting the alliance
or investing in advertising.
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the performance-criterion can alter the partners’ incentives to exert effort. Accordingly, our
goal here is to compare the relative merits of two types of agreements: those contingent on
(1) the partner’s marketing actions (e.g., level of Happy Meal promotions by McDonald’s)
and (2) the partner’s outcomes (e.g., sales levels of Happy Meals). In this comparison, we
are particularly interested in the role played by any demand linkage or externality that exists
among the partners.
In the absence of any demand externality, when contracting with an asymmetrically
informed partner (or agent), Khalil and Lawarree (1995) (KL) demonstrate that contracts
based on outputs generate superior returns to the principal. The logic underlying KL’s result
is as follows: Suppose the agent were a residual claimant—as is typically the case in any co-
marketing alliance—and the contract were contingent on monitored outputs (KL refer to this
setup as output monitoring). In such settings, the agent has discretion over the level of effort
expended on behalf of the partnership (this feature is noted in the many analyses of agency
relationships studied in marketing). Now, by contrast, suppose that inputs are contracted
upon. In such a setting (aka input monitoring), if an agent in a more productive state of
nature were to claim to be in a less productive state, then by virtue of being the residual
claimant, that agent can appropriate some of the output generated from the alliance without
sharing it with the principal (since the output is not monitored). This additional output
that the agent can pocket under input monitoring serves as a deciding factor in arriving at
KL’s main finding that the principal prefers monitoring the agent’s output rather than the
level of effort. Interestingly, though, anecdotal evidence suggests that the contractual terms
between partners in a co-marketing alliance are typically based on marketing actions rather
than on marketing outcomes: As noted earlier, in its alliance with Disney, McDonald’s was
contractually required to invest in promoting the partnership while paying Disney a fee for
the right to use its characters. Since such terms seem counter to the findings in KL, our goal
here is to explore when such contracts may be preferred.
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Accordingly, we build on KL’s adverse selection setting and develop a simple multiple
agent model—in which a focal firm contracts with two privately informed partners—to iden-
tify when a contract contingent on inputs may be preferred over an output-based contract.
Our analysis reveals that the nature of the demand externality among the alliance partners
plays a critical role in the choice between these two contract forms. Intuitively, as in the
single agent setting, when only the outputs are monitored, agents have an opportunity to
limit the efforts put forth on behalf of the alliance. Further, the presence of a positive de-
mand externality in the multi-agent setting tends to result in even lower effort levels than
in the single agent setting. As the strength of the positive demand externality goes up, the
multiple agents’ effort levels shrink to correspondingly lower levels, and the principal’s losses
(along with those of the alliance) to correspondingly higher levels.
In contrast, by monitoring inputs, the principal effectively raises the effort (or marketing
investment) levels that the multiple agents put forth. The positive demand externality,
in turn, generates more output; since the partners are residual claimants, and the principal
only monitors inputs, there is more output that can be appropriated by the partners without
sharing it with the principal. At lower strengths of the positive externality, the principal
continues to prefer output monitoring as noted in KL. When the positive demand externality
is sufficiently strong, however, the lower effort levels induced under output monitoring can
prove to be too costly for the principal; and input monitoring becomes the preferred contract
form.
In what follows, we develop and analyze a mathematical model and present more precise
conditions (involving either a positive or a negative externality) where one type of contract
may be preferred over the other. We also highlight the conditions under which the effort
levels under one type of contract dominate those in the other type of contract. By evaluating
the relative effectiveness of alternative contractual terms, our analysis adds to both the co-
marketing alliance literature as well as to the agency literature dealing with monitoring issues
in adverse selection settings.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the relevant
literature and section 2.3 develops the model. Section 2.4 presents our analysis and results
while the final section concludes the paper. All proofs are confined to an appendix.
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2.2 Literature Review
Co-marketing alliances are contractual relationships that are undertaken by firms that intend
to enhance the value of their offerings to consumers (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993). Disney-
McDonald’s, Coke-NutraSweet, Coke-Bacardi Rum, Intel-Compaq, etc., are examples of such
alliances in the marketplace. Researchers have noted that these alliances can help signal
product quality to consumers, reach new segments, or even enhance the appeal to current
market segments ( Rao and Ruekert 1994, Rao et al 1999, Venkatesh et al 2000 and Bucklin
and Sengupta 1993). Since our focus here is on the relative effectiveness of alternative
contractual forms in a co-marketing alliance, we now discuss the literature related to the
success of these alliances.
Many factors affect the success or failure of co-marketing alliances. Bucklin and Sen-
gupta (1993), for example, find that higher payoffs (strategic value of the partnership net
of development cost) from an alliance and greater organizational compatibility between the
partnering firms impact the effectiveness of the co-marketing alliance positively. Venkatesh
et al (2000) investigate co-marketing alliances that produce a series of co-branded products
(e.g., Compaq PCs with Intel Inside), and find that such dynamic partnerships are attractive
only if the alliance can help expand the market size significantly. Next, partner selection can
clearly affect success, and in the context of a co-marketing alliance that involves a product
with branded components, Venkatesh and Mahajan (1997) discuss an analytical approach
for optimal pricing and partner selection—their focus is on whether to align with another
branded component manufacturer or with an unbranded component manufacturer.
It is worth noting that the impact of contractual agreements on the partners’ investment
(along with partner selection and other issues) has been investigated in the context of R&D
alliances (see Veugelers 1998 for a review of this literature, and Amaldoss et al 2000 and Jap
2001 for more recent work). Amaldoss et al (2000) find that the partner’s investments in
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a new product development alliance depend on the type of profit sharing (equal or propor-
tional) agreements between the partners. Similarly, in the context of complex collaborations
(such as R&D alliances), Jap (2001) finds that the profit sharing principle (equity or equal-
ity) impacts the outcomes of the alliance. Such analyses, however, are absent in the context
of co-marketing alliances. As noted in Simonin and Ruth (1998), co-marketing alliances
can arise when the partners’ brands or products are combined either physically (e.g. Com-
paq computers with Intel microprocessors) or symbolically (e.g., McDonald’s promotions
involving Disney movie characters3).
When forming co-marketing alliances, firms typically contract with multiple partners.
When multiple partners are involved in such an alliance, each partner’s marketing actions
are likely to affect the outcomes generated by the other partners. Past research has dis-
cussed the impact of such an externality in different contexts. Amaldoss et al (2000), for
instance, show that in a joint product development alliance, each partner can free ride on
the investments made by the other partners, thereby leading to an under-investment prob-
lem in the alliance. Other research on R&D alliances (Veugelers 1998), too, shows that the
presence externalities among the partners lead to lower R&D investments. Similarly, in the
context of franchising, Lal (1990) finds an analogous under-investment problem when the
actions of one franchisee benefits other franchisees. In light of such analyses, we expect that
when there is a positive demand externality, the co-marketing alliance will also experience
an under-investment problem. Our interest, therefore, is to understand which of two types of
contractual agreements can provide the appropriate incentives to the alliance partners and
limit the under-investment problem.
As noted in the introduction, contracts are typically structured to be contingent on
various aspects of performance—this can be on marketing actions (e.g., certain amount of
funds should be devoted to advertising) and/or on marketing outcomes (e.g., on achieved
sales). Under information asymmetry though, varying the performance-criterion is likely to
3The hamburgers sold by McDonald’s do not involve any ingredient from Disney.
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alter the partners’ incentives (e.g., see Basu et al 1985, Raju and Srinivasan 1996, Holmstrom
and Milgrom 1991, Maskin and Riley 1985, Khalil and Lawarree 1995, Desai and Srinivasan
1995, Anderson and Oliver 1987 and Mishra and Prasad 2004). This stream of work employs
the agency theory framework to examine incentive problems in a variety of organizational
settings, including salesforces, distribution channels and regulatory contexts.
Notice that when proposing the alliance to potential partners, Disney, for example, offers
the right to use its movie in return for a fee and a performance requirement that partners
invest in promoting the alliance. In this setting, Disney can be viewed as a principal and the
other partners as agents who work on behalf of the principal. From that perspective, our
work is closely related to that of Khalil and Lawarree (1995)(KL). KL compare the relative
attractiveness of using a contract contingent on marketing actions to a contract contingent
on marketing outcomes in the context of a single principal-single agent setting. When the
agents are residual claimants—i.e., the output generated by an agent accrues to that agent
minus a lump sum transfer payment to the principal, as, for example, in a co-marketing
alliance—KL find that a contract contingent on marketing outcomes is always preferred to
a contract contingent on marketing actions. Our goal here is to explore the impact of a
demand externality on the optimality of such contracts.
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2.3 The Model
We consider an adverse selection model in which a risk neutral principal, P , enters into
an alliance with two risk neutral partners A and B who exert efforts eA and eB respectively4.
The output from partner k, depends on the efforts exerted by both partners and a random
state of nature5, θkm, m ∈ {L,H}, with 0 < θkL < θkH , k ∈ {A,B}. Given an effort choice el
by partner l, we denote the output from partner k by Q(ek, el, θk) where k, l ∈ {A,B}, k 6= l,
and this output function is assumed to satisfy the conditions6 Q1 > 0, Q2 > 0, Q3 > 0,
Q11 ≤ 0 and Q13 ≥ 0. The cost of exerting effort ek under state θk is given by C(ek, θk) and
this cost function is assumed to satisfy the conditions C1 > 0, C2 < 0, C11 > 0, C12 < 0 and
C(0, θk) = 0 ∀k ∈ {A,B}.
The sequence of events in the model are as follows:
(i) Nature moves first and chooses the productivity parameter θk and partner k privately
observes the realization of θk; the probability that partner k is in state θkm, denoted φ
k
m,
however, is common knowledge, ∀ k ∈ {A,B} and m ∈ {L,H}.
(ii) The principal chooses the monitoring instrument, Z, where Z ∈ {I, O} with I and
O denoting input and output respectively, and offers each partner a contract that
specifies either the pair (ek,I,T k,I)—i.e., effort ek,I and transfer payment T k,I under
input monitoring—or the pair (Qk,O,T k,O)—i.e., output Qk,O and transfer payment T k,O
under output monitoring—contingent on the monitored instrument7.
4As noted earlier, we use the term “effort” to refer to include marketing actions such as promoting the
alliance or investing in advertising.
5We assume that the price of the product sold by the partners is constant and is unaffected by the alliance.
This feature is observed in several co-marketing alliances. For example, the price set by McDonald’s for its
product (the ‘Happy Meal’) that is part of the joint promotion remains constant and does not depend on
the specific Disney movie that is promoted.
6Here and throughout the paper, we use numerical subscripts to denote partial derivatives: e.g., Q1
denotes the partial derivative with respect to partner k’s own effort ek, while Q11 denotes its second partial
derivative and Q13 denotes the cross partial derivative with θk.
7Here, if both input and output could be observed costlessly and contracted upon, then information
asymmetry will not affect the principal’s profitability. Therefore, to highlight the relative strengths of
the two instruments, we assume that the principal can monitor only one instrument without cost. While
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(iii) The partners decide simultaneously and noncollusively whether or not to sign the con-
tract; if the contract is not signed, each partner obtains a reservation profit normalized
at zero. If the contract is signed, then each partner chooses its effort to perform as
stipulated in the contract; subsequently, monitoring and transfers occur as promised.
Under the above structure, each partner is a residual claimant and enjoys any output that
remains after making the transfer payment to the principal. In this setting, the principal’s
profits ΠP , can be expressed as:
ΠP = φAHE[T
A
H ] + (1− φAH)E[TAL ] + φBHE[TBH ] + (1− φBH)E[TBL ] (Eq. 2.1)




mH +(1−φlH)T kmL, with the subscripts mL and mH on T k accommodating
the possibility of varying the transfer payments based on the states of both partners, k, l ∈
{A,B}, k 6= l and m ∈ {L,H}.
Given a monitoring instrument Z, Z ∈ {I, O}, we use πk,Zn|m(.) to denote k’s profit when
that partner is in state m but reports to be in state n, ∀m,n ∈ {H,L}. As in standard
adverse selection settings, for a given Z, the principal’s problem here is to design a contract
that maximizes ΠP subject to the conditions that each partner receives at least its reservation
profit (equivalently, πk,Zm|m ≥ 0 k ∈ {A,B}) while revealing the private information truthfully
as a best response to the other partner doing the same (equivalently, πk,Zm|m ≥ π
k,Z
n|m ∀ k ∈
{A,B}). Ultimately, the principal will select that monitoring instrument which will generate
the highest expected profit.
For ease of exposition, we now focus on the following simple demand and cost structures
(in the Appendix, we show how our analysis holds for the more general demand and cost



















where k, l ∈ {A,B}, k 6= l,m ∈ {L,H} and δ > 0 is the extent to which partner l’s effort
impacts partner k’s output.
With the above setup in mind, before deriving the optimal contracts under input and out-
put monitoring, we first discuss the principal’s optimization problem under full information
(where both the partners’ efforts and realized states are costlessly observed by the principal).
This ‘first-best’ solution serves as a benchmark and here, the principal only needs to ensure
that each partner receives its reservation utility; the corresponding individual rationality






















− E[T kH] ≥ 0 (IRkH)
where we use E[el] to denote φlHe
l
H + (1− φlH)elL.
The properties of the first-best solution are summarized in the following lemma (all proofs
are in the Appendix):
Lemma 2.1 The optimal effort levels induced under full information are such that ∀ k, l ∈
{A,B}, k 6= l and m ∈ {L,H}:
ekm
θkm







m + δ), (Eq. 2.5)
and the optimal transfer payments are given by


















is the marginal cost of effort and Q1 =
∂Q
∂ekm
= θkm is its marginal revenue. Since the externality is positive (δ > 0), we can see
from equation (Eq. 2.4) that the principal optimally induces each partner to exert an effort
level such that its marginal revenue is less than the marginal cost. Without the principal’s
intervention, however, the partners would prefer to exert an effort level such that its marginal
cost equals the marginal revenue. Hence, under a positive (negative) externality, the principal
induces the partners to exert more (less) effort than the partners would prefer to exert when
left to themselves. Finally, notice that each partner is restricted to exactly its reservation
profit.
2.4 Analysis and Results
In this section, we first develop the principal’s optimal contract under input monitoring
and output monitoring in that order. Subsequently, we compare the two monitoring regimes
and characterize when the principal will prefer input monitoring over output monitoring.
This comparison is first conducted when the partners’ demand functions exhibit a positive
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externality. Later, we show how the optimal monitoring regime changes when the demand
functions exhibit either no externality or a negative externality.
2.4.1 Input Monitoring
When the principal uses input monitoring, each partner can commit to a certain effort level
while lying about the state. For example, a partner in the higher state could report being
in the lower state, and thereby benefit from being required to commit to a lower effort level
(corresponding to the lower state). In the Disney-McDonald’s alliance, for instance, it is in
McDonald’s interest to lower the payments made to Disney. One way to effect this is to
claim that the promotion may not be too effective—thereby reducing Disney’s estimate of
the boost in demand and subsequently on how much of the combined profit is transferred to











− E[T k,In ] (Eq. 2.7)
where k, l ∈ {A,B}, k 6= l and πk,In|m is partner k’s profits when the partner is in state m and





subject to πk,Im|m ≥ 0 (IR
k,I
m )
and πk,Im|m ≥ π
k,I
n|m ∀ k ∈ {A,B},m, n ∈ {L,H} (IC
k,I
m )
The properties of a solution to the above problem are summarized in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 2.2 At the solution to [P-IM], ∀ k, l ∈ {A,B}, k 6= l and m ∈ {L,H}, a partner
in the lower state is restricted to its reservation utility, while a partner in the higher state
















Further, the optimal effort levels satisfy these conditions:
ek,IL
θkL






= θkL, (Eq. 2.9)
ek,IH
θkH


















H + δ), (Eq. 2.12)
and the optimal transfer payments are given by

































As in the solution to the standard adverse selection problem, notice from the above
lemma too that the principal induces the higher type partner to exert the first-best level of
effort while inducing a partner in the lower state to exert lower than the first-best level. This
result arises because, first the rents accruing to the partners reduce the principal’s profit;




> 0). Consequently, the principal optimally lowers the effort exerted by
the partner in the lower state. It is also worth pointing out (for later comparison) that the
rents can be sorted into two components:
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(i) rent due to extra output [ek,IL θ
k
H − ek,IL θkL] that is not shared with the principal when
misrepresenting the state and











when misrepresenting the state.
Finally, from the effort levels listed in Lemma (4.7) we can see that when the externality δ






> 0). Further, when the effort levels under the low state increase, each
of the rent components listed above also increase; hence, an increase in δ would lead to an
increase in rents.
2.4.2 Output Monitoring
Here, the principal specifies and monitors the output produced by each partner. Recall that
the output Q(.) produced by partner k depends on the effort exerted by both partners as
well as the state of θk. Consequently, given a level of effort exerted by the other partner,
and truthful revelation of private information, we can compute partner k’s required effort
to produce any specified output level. In other words, the pair of contracts (QA,O, TA,O) and
(QB,O, TB,O) can be expressed equivalently in terms of efforts as (eA,O, TA,O) and (eB,O, TB,O),
where the ek,Os are obtained by simultaneously inverting the demand functions of the two
partners8. This equivalence facilitates comparing the two monitoring regimes (KL follow a
similar approach) and in what follows, we will assume that the principal monitors the output
and specifies the required (but unmonitored) input for the two partners.
Now, since partner k observes the realization of θk privately, there is an opportunity for
that partner to misrepresent its private information. For example, when a partner is in the
higher state but reports being in the lower state, it benefits from being required to produce a
8For more details on this equivalence, please see the Appendix.
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lower output; the required output will be Q(ekL, e










l. Since Q3 > 0, k selects an effort level, ẽ
k
H, such that Q(ẽ
k
H, e















< ekL. Hence, the partner’s profits



















− E[T kn ]. (Eq. 2.16)





subject to πk,Om|m ≥ 0 (IR
k,O
m )
and πk,Om|m ≥ π
k,O
n|m ∀ k ∈ {A,B},m, n ∈ {L,H} (IC
k,O
m )
The properties of a solution to the above problem are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2.3 At the solution to [P-OM], ∀ k, l ∈ {A,B}, k 6= l and m ∈ {L,H}, a partner
in the lower state is restricted to its reservation utility, while a partner in the higher state



























Further, the optimal effort levels satisfy these conditions:
ek,OL
θkL










= θkL, (Eq. 2.18)
ek,OH
θkH


















H + δ), (Eq. 2.21)
and the optimal transfer payments are given by




































Analogous to the input monitoring case, here too the principal induces a partner in the
higher state to exert the first-best effort level while inducing a partner in the lower state to
exert lower than the first best effort level. Further, the rents accruing to the higher state
partner can be sorted as follows:














needed to generate the output when mis-
representing the state and











when misrepresenting the state.
Again, we can see that as the externality parameter becomes larger, the principal would







when the effort levels under the low state go up, each of the rent components listed above
also go up; hence, an increase in δ would lead to an increase in rents.
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2.4.3 Comparing Input and Output Monitoring
Begin by noting that the principal can induce the optimal effort levels of output monitoring
(i.e., ek,Om reported in Lemma 3) under the input monitoring regime with appropriate transfers.
More specifically, under input monitoring, ∀ k, l ∈ {A,B}, k 6= l and m ∈ {L,H}, the
following transfers will induce partner k to exert ek,Om :

































Next recall the transfer payments for the output monitoring regime from Lemma 3:




































With the transfers specified in equations (Eq. 2.24)-(Eq. 2.25) and in equations (Eq. 2.26)-
(Eq. 2.27), identical effort levels are exerted by the partners under the two regimes. If
input monitoring is more profitable than output monitoring when ek,Om is induced, then input
monitoring will be at least weakly better than output monitoring at the optimal effort levels
under input monitoring (i.e., at ek,Im from Lemma 2). Note that this approach generates a
sufficient condition for input monitoring to be preferred. Comparing the principals’ profits
(using the transfer payments in (Eq. 2.24)-(Eq. 2.25) and (Eq. 2.26)-(Eq. 2.27)), we see that
the transfer payments are identical under the low state condition and the difference in profits
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comes from the transfers under the high state.





























− eB,OL (θBH − θBL )
)
. (Eq. 2.28)
From equation (Eq. 2.28) we can see that input monitoring is more profitable than output
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Proposition 2.1 When the positive externality parameter is sufficiently large (formally,
such that δ > δ∗), input monitoring is more profitable than output monitoring.
From Lemma 2 we know that the rents accrued to the partner under input monitoring have
two components : rents due to extra output, and rents due to lower cost of effort. Similarly,
from Lemma 3, we know that the rents under output monitoring have two components:
rents due to lower effort, and rents due to lower cost of effort. Now the rents from the
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lower cost of effort are identical (for a given level of effort across regimes). Consequently,
we can see from (Eq. 2.29) and (Eq. 2.30) that the difference in the principal’s profit arises
from the difference in rents due to lower effort (which is the source of additional rents under
output monitoring) and extra output (which is the source of additional rents under input
monitoring). We also know that the principal induces the partners to exert higher effort
as the magnitude of the demand externality parameter becomes larger. At higher levels of
effort, the rents under output monitoring (arising out of cost savings due to lower effort)
become larger at a faster rate than the rents under input monitoring. Therefore, when the
demand externality is sufficiently strong ( i.e., δ > δ∗), the rents under output monitoring
dominate those under input monitoring, and the principal prefers the latter regime.
It is worth recording how the parameters, θkm (denoting the productivity state of partner
k) and φkm (the probability of being in the lower state), k = A,B, and m ∈ {L,H}, affect
the critical externality parameter δ∗. It is easy to show that δ∗ becomes smaller as (a) θkL
becomes larger; (b) θkH becomes smaller; and (c) φ
k
L becomes larger. The intuition underlying
these comparative statics results can be explained as follows.
Under output monitoring, when the productivity level in the lower state of nature, θkL, be-














are affected in two ways:









> 0). Hence, the direct impact of an increase in θkL is to




(ii) Further, at a higher θkL, the partner will be induced to exert a higher level of effort in
the lower state as well (since ∂eL
∂θkL













Analogously, under input monitoring, the rents arising due to extra output (evaluated at the
optimal output-monitoring effort levels and given by R̄kI = ek,OL (θ
k
H− θkL)) are affected in two
ways:
(i) First, an increase in θkL would directly lower R̄
kI since (θkH − θkL) goes down.
(ii) At the same time, however, the principal would require the partners to exert higher
effort levels (since ∂eL
∂θkL











Interestingly, the rates at which R̄kO and R̄kI change with eL and θ
k











∣∣∣. The implication of these patterns is that the difference in
rents, R̄kO− R̄kI, is increasing in θkL. Since δ > δ∗ ensures that R̄kO− R̄kI > 0, it follows that
a smaller δ∗ is sufficient to achieve the same result when θkL is larger. Hence, δ
∗ is decreasing




explained (it is in a direction opposite to the effect of θkL).
Consider what happens when the probability φkL, that the partner k is in the lower state
θkL, becomes larger: first, the principal would induce the partners in the lower state to exert
greater effort (since ∂eL
∂φkL











> 0). Next, recall that a given increment in
effort would lead to a greater increment in the rents under output monitoring than under






> 0). Hence, the difference in rents, R̄kO − R̄kI, is
increasing in φkL. Consequently, a smaller δ
∗ is sufficient to ensure R̄kO− R̄kI > 0. Finally, in




H = 1− φkL); therefore,
an increase in φkH would result in raising δ
∗.
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Translating the above to the multi partner co-marketing alliance (such as the alliance
between the focal firm Disney and the partnering firms, McDonald’s, Old Navy, Kellogg’s,
and others), we note the following: when δ > δ∗, marketing efforts (e.g., promotion and
advertising investments) by one partner accrue significant benefits to the other partners as
well. In such a setting, if Disney were to employ contracts contingent on the partner’s sales,
it will be detrimental to the health of the alliance because the partners will limit their efforts.
Further, either if the states of productivity are not too different from one another, or if the
chance of the lower productivity state is higher, then Disney should be that much more
inclined to adopting contracts contingent on marketing actions.
2.4.4 Either Negative Externality or No Externality
So far, we considered the impact of a positive externality between the partners in a co-
marketing alliance; here, we discuss the impact of either a negative externality or no exter-
nality(i.e., δ ≤ 0). Such settings can arise, for example, when the partner firms are in closely
related product categories9.
Proposition 2.2 When there is either a negative externality or no externality among the
partners, a contract that is contingent on marketing outcomes is more profitable than a
contract that is contingent on marketing actions.
9In the co-marketing alliance between Lucasfilm, Burger King, Kraft Foods, Dr Pepper, Expedia and
others (that involved Lucasfim’s movie “Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull”), some of the
alliance partners are in closely related product categories—Burger King and Kraft Foods (Kraft Lunchables)
cater to consumers (more specifically children) in the fast food category. Consumers often operate on limited
budgets and limit the number of purchases in any given category—anecdotal evidence from the fast food
industry suggests that families limit Happy Meal purchases to about 3 times in a month. Therefore, when
two firms operating in related product categories invest in promoting the alliance, each firm’s promotions
can take the sales away from the other firm, and can counter the benefit arising from promoting the movie.
If the negative impact of the partners’ marketing efforts is sufficiently strong, it can result in a net (zero or)
negative externality.
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This result stems from the fact that when the effort exerted by the partners exhibits a
(weakly) negative externality, the principal finds it attractive to induce the partners in the
lower state to exert (weakly) lower marketing effort, thereby reducing the negative impact
of each other’s effort on their respective outputs. At these lower levels of marketing efforts,
the marginal benefit from output dominates the marginal cost of effort irrespective of the
magnitude of the externality (as long as the externality parameter, δ is weakly negative).
Consequently, the rents to the partners resulting from extra output (under input monitoring)
are greater than the rents to the partners resulting from lower effort (under output monitor-
ing). Hence, from the principal’s perspective, a contract contingent on marketing outcomes
is preferred to a contract contingent on marketing actions. This result is consistent with the
findings of Khalil and Lawarree (1995) who compare input and output monitoring in the
context of a single principal contracting with a single agent (and therefore no externality).
2.4.5 Comparing the Effort Levels Under Input and Output Monitoring
In the previous sub-sections, we have shown that when the externality amongst the partners
is positive and sufficiently strong, the principal in a co-marketing alliance would prefer a
contract contingent on marketing actions over a contract contingent on marketing outcomes.
Here, we focus on the conditions when a monitoring regime will result in higher levels of
effort on behalf of the alliance. From the discussion in the previous sections, we know that
the principal, under both input and output monitoring regimes, induces the partner in the
lower state to exert lower effort compared to first best levels (in contrast to the partners in












we show in the appendix that when δ > δ̃, the optimal effort levels under input monitoring
dominate those under input monitoring. It is worth recalling that, as shown in equation
(Eq. 2.28), the difference in the principal’s profits under input and output monitoring de-
pends on the difference in the rents due to lower effort and the rents due to extra output. In
contrast, it is sufficient10 for the marginal-rents-due-to-lower-effort to dominate the marginal-
rents-due-to-extra-output for input monitoring to induce greater effort levels. Since the rents
due to either the lower effort or the extra output are monotonic, a smaller positive external-
ity, δ̃ (< δ∗), is sufficient for ek,IL > e
k,O
L (than for Π
P,I > ΠP,O). In terms of the co-marketing
alliance setting (such as the alliance between Sony and say the partners McDonald’s and
Old Navy), this result indicates that there are two levels of thresholds for the strength of
the positive demand externality. When the lower of the two thresholds is exceeded, the
partners can be expected to invest more heavily into the alliance under input monitoring;
this however is not sufficient for Sony to prefer input monitoring; instead, other conditions
(e.g., breaching the higher threshold) also need to be satisfied.
2.5 Conclusion
In forming co-marketing alliances, companies such as Sony often contract with multiple
partners (e.g., McDonald’s, Old Navy). In such alliances, there are often demand externali-
ties, in the sense that the marketing investments of one partner (e.g., Old Navy) on behalf
of the alliance (e.g., involving Sony’s Surf’s Up movie) are likely to impact the sales of the
other partner (e.g., McDonald’s who is selling its Happy Meals with Surf’s Up toys). When
these partners benefit from each other’s investments, they all tend to under invest in pro-
moting the alliance and thereby reduce the payoffs from the alliance. Clearly, the alliance’s
10See the appendix for all proofs.
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promoter (e.g., Sony or Disney) has an incentive to ensure that the alliance partners put
forth appropriate levels of marketing effort. Accordingly, the central question we addressed
in this research is: “What is the relative effectiveness of two types of contracts in ensuring
that the partners invest appropriately in promoting the alliance?”
We developed an analytical model to compare two types of contracts—one that hinges on
observing the partner’s marketing actions (input monitoring) versus another that hinges on
observing the marketing outcomes generated by the partners (output monitoring)—between
a single principal (e.g., Disney) and multiple partners (e.g., McDonald’s and Kellogg’s).
We find that the presence of a substantial positive externality among the partners in a
co-marketing alliance is likely to tip the balance in favor of input monitoring. When the
magnitude of the externality is not too strong (or for that matter negative), then output
monitoring is likely to be preferred. This research suggests that firms such as Disney and
Sony must be mindful of the magnitude of any externality among the (potential) partners
in determining the terms of the contract offered to the partners.
Directions for further work include examining settings when the externality among the
agents is asymmetric, i.e., when the actions of some partners present a positive externality
while the actions of other agents do not; in such contexts, we anticipate that the required
externality among the partners has to be even larger (than what we reported) to make a
contract contingent on marketing actions to be more profitable. It will also be worthwhile
to investigate the impact of correlated private information (e.g., see Demski and Sappington
1984) among the partners.
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CHAPTER 3: COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING WITH
SYMMETRIC RETAILERS
3.1 Introduction
Cooperative advertising is an common arrangement between members of a distribution chan-
nel whereby upstream channel members (e.g., manufacturers) reimburse a portion of the
advertising costs of downstream members (e.g., retailers). Manufacturers often offer such
cooperative advertising contracts as an incentive for the downstream retailers to increase
their local advertising levels. Cooperative advertising is widely used by manufacturers and
by one estimate, about $30 billion was used in 1998 for cooperative advertising (Davis 1999).
Cooperative advertising contracts specify the percentage (called the participation rate)
of advertising costs that are reimbursable and also specify limits (called the accrual rate)
on the total reimbursement offered. The accrual rate specified by the manufacturers can
either be a fraction of the purchases made by the retailer (wholesale receipts) or a fixed
dollar amount. Dutta et al (1995) report that participation rates vary between 25 and 100
percent, with 50 and 100 percent being commonly used. With regards to the accrual rate
linked to wholesale receipts, Dutta et al find that participation rates vary between 0.003 to
33 percent of wholesale receipts. While Dutta et al are silent on the fixed accrual rates, there
are examples1 of manufacturers using a fixed dollar amount as an accrual rate as well.
When multiple retailers sell products from a common manufacturer, each retailer’s ad-
vertising levels affect the demand faced by the other retailers. When each retailer selling the
same end product advertises the product, other retailers can also benefit from this effort.
1For example, Aquarium Pharmaceuticals Inc. offers a cooperative advertising program to pet stores
selling its products. As part of this program, Aquarium Pharmaceuticals reimburses 50% of the cost of
advertisements that include its brands and this reimbursement limited to a maximum of $75 per retailer.
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This positive externality causes each retailer to free-ride on other retailer’s effort and leads
to an overall reduction in the levels of advertising. The reduction in the overall levels of
advertising decreases the total demand for the manufacturer’s product and in turn hurts the
manufacturer’s profits. In order to combat the free-riding of the retailers, manufacturers can
offer cooperative advertising contracts that offset some of the retailer’s advertising expenses
and thereby provide an incentive to increase their overall levels of advertising. In this paper,
we investigate the use of the cooperative advertising participation rate and the two types
of accrual rates in their effectiveness to provide the retailers with appropriate incentives to
increase their levels of advertising.
While previous research on cooperative advertising focused on the use of a single partic-
ipation rate (Bergen and John 1997, Huang et al 2002, He et al 2007), to our knowledge,
our work is the first attempt to understand the impact of the two types of accrual rates on
retailer’s advertising levels. As Dutta et al (1995) report, many firms use a combination of
participation and accrual rates in their cooperative advertising contracts. Given the preva-
lence of the use of these two types of contracts, it is important to investigate the impact
of these contractual variables. Hence this work contributes to the literature by providing
an understanding of the various types of contractual mechanisms available to manufacturers
and provides guidelines for the use of these contracts.
In this research, we consider a manufacturer selling its products through two symmetric
independent retailers. The retailers face positive advertising externalities and in the absence
of any cooperative advertising contract, under invest in advertising. We then show that
the manufacturer can use a cooperative advertising contract that only includes a single
participation rate offered to both the retailers to increase the overall levels of advertising. The
retailers, left to themselves, only consider their own benefit from the advertising investments
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they make (while ignoring the overall benefits to the channel). This leads to the retailers
investing in lower levels of advertising than what is preferred by the manufacturer. When
the manufacturer offers the retailers a cooperative advertising contract that reimburses part
of their advertising expenses (participation rate contract), the retailer’s marginal cost of
advertising is lowered and they find it attractive to increase their investments in advertising.
The manufacturer can choose the participation rate such that the retailers increase their
advertisements levels to that preferred by the manufacturer. Hence, the manufacturer uses
the participation rate to align the interests of the retailer with the interests of the channel.
We derive the optimal participation rate required to align the retailers’ interest with that
of the channel for a very general demand structure, without making specific assumptions
regarding the functional form of the demand faced by the retailers. Hence, this provides a
useful analytical tool to determine the participation rates in a variety of settings.
Next, we show that the manufacturer can also achieve coordination in the channel by
using a combination of the participation rate and either of the two types of accrual rates.
When the manufacturer uses an accrual rate in addition to the participation rate, the manu-
facturer can set the participation rates at higher levels than that required to coordinate the
channel under the participation rate contract. This provides the retailers with an incentive
to increase their advertising levels by a greater amount than under a single participation rate
contract. The manufacturer then limits the total reimbursement to the retailers by using an
accrual rate that is either a fixed amount or a fraction of the wholesale receipts from the
retailer. While the retailers have an incentive to increase advertising to levels beyond what
is sufficient to coordinate the channel, the manufacturer uses the cap on reimbursement to
limit the retailer’s advertising to the channel coordinating levels. Hence, the manufacturer
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can use both the participation rate and the accrual rate to achieve the same result achieved
through the use of a participation rate alone.
While the two types of accrual rates can help coordinate the advertising levels in the
distribution channel, each type of accrual rate has a unique impact on retail prices and
advertising levels. The accrual rate that is set as a fixed amount has a positive impact on
retail prices. As the manufacturer increases the fixed cap, retailers tend to increase prices.
Since the increases in the fixed cap induces the retailers to increase their advertising levels,
the increase in the advertising levels in turn leads the retailers to increase retail prices. While
this indirect impact of the increase in advertising levels on retail prices also exits when the
manufacturer uses an accrual rate linked to wholesale receipts, the increase in the accrual
rate also has a negative direct impact on retail prices.
When the manufacturer uses an accrual rate linked to wholesale receipts, unlike the
fixed accrual rate scenario, the retailers can influence the cap on reimbursements through
their choices of price and effort levels. As retailers decrease prices (or increase effort), retail
demand goes up and in turn the wholesale receipts go up. This leads to an increase in the
cap on cooperative advertising reimbursements. Hence, as the manufacturer increases the
accrual rate linked to wholesale receipts, the retailers may find it attractive to decrease retail
prices and thereby further increase the cap on reimbursements. As the accrual rate increases,
the increase in the cap for a unit decrease in retail prices is higher (compared to when the
accrual rate is lower). Hence, the net effect of an increase in accrual rate linked to wholesale
receipts may lead to a reduction in retail prices as opposed to an increase in retail prices
(that occurs under the fixed accrual rate contract). In what follows, these and other such
unique effects of each type of accrual rate are discussed in detail.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section reviews the relevant
literature and section 3 develops the model. Section 4 presents our analysis and results
while the final section concludes the paper. All proofs are confined to an appendix.
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3.2 Literature Review
The literature on cooperative advertising is part of the broader stream of literature on
vertical control in distribution channels. In a distribution channel, the downstream firms
(e.g., retailers) do not always make decisions (prices, quantities and efforts) that are favorable
to the upstream players (e.g., manufacturers). Hence, upstream channel members tend to
use various contractual provisions like nonlinear wholesale prices, territorial restrictions,
quantity limits and retail price restrictions to induce the downstream members to make
decisions favorable to the upstream members. The various vertical controls used by upstream
channel members can be broadly classified (Ray and Tirole 1986, Ray and Verge 2005)
into two categories : 1) payment schemes and 2) provisions limiting the parties’ rights.
Contractual provisions in the payment schemes category include non-linear tariffs, royalty
payments, cooperative advertising, among others. Contractual provisions that limit some of
the downstream members rights include Resale price maintenance (RPM), quantity fixing
and exclusive territories.
The need to exert control on downstream channel members may arise due to presence
of three sources2 of externalities in the distribution channel. The first externality arises due
to standard double marginalization problem. In a typical distribution channel, each channel
member’s selling price includes a mark up over their costs. The mark up added by down-
stream channel members makes final prices to consumers to be higher than what upstream
channel members prefer. This coordination problem is termed as the “double marginaliza-
tion” problem and was formally analyzed by Spengler (1950). Since each channel member
does not take into account the impact of their mark up on the other channel member’s prof-
its, the mark up by downstream channel members results in an externality to the upstream
2see Mathewson and Winter (1984) for a detailed discussion of these externalities.
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channel members. The second externality can arise due to intrabrand competition. When
multiple downstream members (retailers) sell the same product to end consumers, the price
charged by each retailer presents a positive externality to the other retailers. Hence, an
increase in price by one retailer increases the demand for the other retailers selling the same
product. This horizontal price externality tends to push retail prices to levels that are lower
than what upstream channel members (manufacturers) prefer. The third source of exter-
nality can arise due to advertising/effort spillovers amongst downstream channel members.
When each retailer selling the same end produce exerts sale effort or advertise the product,
the other retailers can benefit from this effort. This positive effort/advertising externality
causes each retailer to free-ride on the other retailers effort and leads to an overall reduction
in advertising/sales effort.
The use of two-part tariffs — that involve charging a fixed fee and a constant per unit
wholesale price — and quantity discounts that provide increasing rebates on the quantity
purchased have been shown to reduce or eliminate the double marginalization problem (Jeu-
land and Shugan 1983, Zusman and Etgar 1981, Ingene and Parry 1995 and others). The
use of resale price maintenance provisions (RPM) that limit the maximum retail price or the
minimum retail price charged by downstream retailers is also shown (Ray and Tirole 1986)
to be useful in combating the double marginalization problem when the downstream demand
is uncertain. Limiting retail prices restricts downstream members from changing the retail
price due to a demand shock (change in demand). Ray and Tirole (1986) show that the
use of two-part tariff is preferred to RPM under cost uncertainty while RPM is preferred to
two-part tariff under demand uncertainty.
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When manufacturers face horizontal price externalities amongst retailers as well as the
externality due to double marginalization, Mathewson and Winter (1984) suggest that man-
ufacturers can use either a two-part tariff with exclusive territory clause or a two-part tariff
with a price floor restriction ( a form of RPM) to mitigate the effects of the two external-
ities. Under exclusive territory clauses, each retailer is assigned the exclusive rights to all
consumers within a territory. The use of exclusive territories removes the retailer’s incen-
tive to cut prices and the two-part tariff can resolve the double marginalization issue. On
the other hand, the manufacturer can use a price floor contract that restricts the retailers
from lowering prices below a level set by the manufacturer to combat the horizontal price
externality and then use a two-part tariff to eliminate the double marginalization problem.
Ray and Stiglitz (1995) show that exclusive territory clauses also affect interbrand com-
petition amongst competing producers (or manufacturers). The authors show that the use
of exclusive territories raises equilibrium prices and profits for each producer. While the use
of a two-part tariff combined with exclusive territory clause can coordinate the channel, the
extent to which the two-part tariff, specifically the fixed fee, can extract the surplus from
downstream retailers can sometimes be legally limited due to limited liability clauses. In
this scenario, Desiraju (2004) shows that upstream channel members can sometimes prefer
to induce intrabrand competition by the use of nonexclusive territories rather than try to
coordinate the channel by reducing intrabrand competition by imposing exclusive territories.
The author shows that when the downstream member’s surplus cannot be fully extracted,
the use of nonexclusive territories may be preferred over exclusive territories.
In scenarios where manufacturers face effort free riding by downstream retailers (along
with double marginalization and horizontal price externalities), Mathewson and Winter
(1984) show that the manufacturer can coordinate the channel by using either a two-part
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tariff and a retail price floor (RPM) or by using a retail price floor along with a restric-
tion on the quantity purchased by the retailers (quantity fixing). While the use of a RPM
and exclusive territory contracts seems to be useful in achieving coordination, several re-
searchers (Mathewson and Winter 1983,Dutta et al 1999) have pointed out conditions under
which these restrictions have a positive impact on social welfare and others (Ray and Ti-
role 1986,Mathewson and Winter 1983,Ray and Stiglitz 1988) have pointed out conditions
under which the restrictions have a negative impact on social welfare. In terms of the U.S.
competition policy towards vertical restraints, resale price restraints are illegal per se and
territorial restrictions are evaluated on a case by case basis3. Two-part tariff and quantity
discounts are deemed legal as long as all downstream channel members are treated equally.
When upstream manufacturers cannot include territorial restricts due to legal restric-
tions (or due to prohibitive monitoring costs), manufacturer’s can use cooperative advertis-
ing (coop) contracts that offset downstream retailer’s advertising expenses to combat the
free-riding externality. Under the cooperative advertising contract, manufacturers offer to
reimburse a portion of the retailers advertising expenses. The fraction of advertising cost
being reimbursed is referred to as the participation rate. Berger (1972) was the first to
analyze the benefits of cooperative advertising and provided a quantitative methodology to
determine the parameters of a cooperative advertising contract. In his model, Berger models
the cooperative advertising contract as a wholesale price discount. Dutta et al (1995) con-
duct an empirical investigation into the variations in the contractual terms of cooperative
advertising contracts. They find that manufacturers use a participation rates for cooperative
advertising contracts vary between 25 and 100 percent of the retailer’s costs, with 50 and 100
percent being most commonly used. The authors note that in addition to the participation
3See Ray and Verge (2005) and Dutta et al (1999) for a discussion of the legal issues relating to vertical
restraints.
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rate, manufacturers often specify an accrual rate — a limit on the total reimbursement that
the manufacturer is willing to offer to the retailers. The authors note that these accrual
rates are part of almost all cooperative advertising plans and that the accrual rate is set
as a percentage of purchases made by the retailers (wholesale receipts). The authors find
that both the accrual and participation rates are higher for consumer products versus indus-
trial products and within consumer products, the rates are higher for convenience products
compared to non convenience products.
Bergen and John (1997) study the impact of advertising spillover, retailer differentia-
tion and manufacturer differentiation on the participation rates in cooperative advertising
contracts. The authors show that manufacturers can use a two-part tariff and a coop par-
ticipation rate to achieve vertical integration profits. The authors consider symmetric re-
tailers that are vertically differentiated and do not consider the impact of the accrual rate
on retail behavior. Huang et al (2002) investigate the use of cooperative advertising in a
manufacturer-retailer supply chain by considering both national brand name investments by
the manufacturer and local advertising by the retailer. In this context, the authors analyze
both manufacturer-as-leader and partnerships advertising structures. Huang and Li (2001)
investigate a cooperative advertising model in the context of a non cooperative simultaneous
move game between the manufacturer and the retailer (in addition to the game structures
considered in Huang et al 2002). Karray and Zaccour (2007) investigate the role of coopera-
tive advertising contracts when both upstream and downstream competition exists. In this
context, the authors find that cooperative advertising contracts increase retail advertissment
levels. In addition, the authors show that cooperative support rates offered by manufacturers
to retailers increase as brand competition intensifies and store competition decreases.
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In a dynamic setting, Jorgensen et al (2001) show that the use of a cooperative advertising
contract can coordinate the channel. The authors assume that advertising has both short and
long terms effects on retail sales and the manufacturer in addition to subsidizing the retailers
local advertising, also invests in national advertising. He et al (2007) investigate cooperative
advertising strategies in a stochastic Stackelberg differential game setting. The authors
provide in feedback form, the optimal advertising and pricing policies for the manufacturer
and the retailer.
While the two streams of literature (static and dynamic) on cooperative advertising
investigate several important issues, none of the articles studies the impact of the two types of
accrual rates. In this sense, our work contributes to the literature on cooperative advertising
and in turn to the literature on vertical control by systematically investigating, in a general
setting, the role of accrual rates in cooperative advertising contracts.
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3.3 The Model
We first describe the model that incorporates no cooperative advertising strategies and later
discuss how the basic model changes with the use of cooperative advertising contracts. We
consider a single manufacturer M that sells its products through two retailers R1 and R2.
The demand faced by retailers R1 and R2 is denoted by Q1 = Q1(p1, p2, e1, e2) and Q
2 =



















∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j (Eq. 3.1)
Where pi and ei are the price charged and effort (advertising) expended by retailer R
i. The
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∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j (Eq. 3.2)
The manufacturer sells the products to retailer Ri at a wholesale price w and also charges a
fixed fee F . Hence, the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)−G1 − F, (Eq. 3.3)
π2 = Q2(p2 − wt)−G2 − F. (Eq. 3.4)
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The manufacturer’s profits can be expressed as
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + 2F. (Eq. 3.5)
where c is the per unit cost incurred by the manufacturer. The manufacturer acts as a
Stackelberg leader and sets the wholesale price and fixed fees for the product before the
retailers set retail prices and effort levels. Given a wholesale price set by the manufacturer,
the retailers simultaneously and independently choose retail price and effort levels in order
to maximize their profits. The manufacturer anticipates the retailers’ actions and choose the
wholesale prices and fixed fees in order to maximize his profits, taking into consideration the
retailers actions.
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3.4 Analysis and Results
We begin by understand the manufacturer’s choices under a vertically integrated channel
(where the manufacturer makes the pricing and effort decisions). We denote this setting as
the first best setting. The retail profits under vertical integration are given by
π1 = Q1(p1 − c)−G1, (Eq. 3.6)
π2 = Q2(p2 − c)−G2. (Eq. 3.7)
Since the manufacturer owns both the retail channels, the manufacturer’s profits can be
expressed as
Π = π1 + π2 = Q1(p1 − c) +Q2(p2 − c)−G1 −G2. (Eq. 3.8)
The manufacturer’s optimization problem (denoted by [M-FB]) can be expressed as
Max Π = Q1(p1 − c) +Q2(p2 − c)−G1 −G2
{p1, p2, e1, e2}
(Eq. 3.9)
The properties of the solution4 to [M-FB] are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.4 The retail price (p1 = p2 = p
∗) and the effort (e1 = e2 = e
∗) that solve [M-FB]
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= 0. (Eq. 3.11)
4All proofs are relegated to the appendix
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From equations (Eq. 3.10) and (Eq. 3.11), we can see that the manufacturer chooses price
and effort such that the difference between the total marginal benefit(to the entire channel)
from price/effort and the total marginal cost(to the entire channel) of price/effort, denoted
by DMRMCfbi ∀i ∈ {p, e} is equal to zero (DMRMCfbp = 0 and DMRMCfbe = 0). Next,
we consider the independent retailer case where the retailers make the price and effort choices
while the manufacturer decides the wholesale price and fixed fees.
3.4.1 Independent Retailers with No Cooperative Advertising
In this case, while the manufacturer charges a wholesale price and a fixed fee, there is no
cooperative advertising contract offered to the retailers. We denote this case as the ‘second
best’ case. The retail profits under this setting are given by equations (Eq. 3.3)-(Eq. 3.4) and
the manufacturer’s profits are given by (Eq. 3.5). The manufacturer chooses the wholesale
prices and fixed fees while anticipating the retailer’s responses to these choices. Also, the
manufacturer ensures that the retailers at least make their reservation profits (assumed to be
zero). Hence, the manufacturer’s optimization problem (denoted by [M-SB]) can be stated
as
Max Π
{w,F, p1, p2, e1, e2}
(Eq. 3.12)













The properties of the solution to [M-SB] are summarized in the following Lemma.
48




(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c), (Eq. 3.13)
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(p2 − c), (Eq. 3.14)
where p1 = p2 = p̂ is the price charged and e1 = e2 = ê is the effort expended by the two
symmetric and independent retail outlets. Also, the price and effort levels under the second
best solution are lower than the price and effort levels under the first best setting ( p̂ < p∗
and ê < e∗) and hence the profits under the second best setting are lower than the first best
profits (Π̂ < Π∗).
From lemma 2, we can see that the retailer’s choice of effort is such that the difference




(w − c) + ∂Q2
∂e1
(p1 − c) > 0 ∀w > c). Also, the retailer’s choice of




(w − c) + ∂Q2
∂p1







DMRMCsbp = 0 but since w > c, we have DMRMC
sb
e > 0. Hence, DMRMC
sb
e and
DMRMCsbp cannot be zero at the same time. Hence, the first best cannot be achieved.
Also, as the manufacturer increases the wholesale price, the price charged by the retailer
increases5 (∂p1
∂w
> 0) and the effort expended by the retailer decreases (∂e1
∂w
< 0). Since
the manufacturer has only one instrument (the wholesale price) to control both the price
and effort charged by the retailers, and since the wholesale price has an opposite effect on
price and effort, first best profits cannot be achieved. Comparing with the first best price
and effort levels, we can show that in equilibrium, the retail prices and effort are such that
5See appendix for the proof.
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p̂ < p∗ and ê < e∗. Since the wholesale price has an opposite effect on the price and effort,
inducing p̂ < p∗ and ê > e∗ or p̂ > p∗ and ê < e∗ is not a potential equilibrium — increasing
or decreasing the wholesale price can move the second best solution closer to the first best
solution. Also, inducing p̂ > p∗ and ê > e∗ would require a very low wholesale price (w < c)
that would also induce p1 < c and thereby leading to negative profits.
3.4.2 Cooperative Advertising Contract That Specifies a Participation Rate
With No Accrual Rate Specified
When the manufacturer uses a cooperative advertising contract that only specifies a partic-
ipation rate, both retailers are reimbursed a fraction α of their advertising expenses. Hence,
the retail profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)−G1 − F + αG1, (Eq. 3.15)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)−G2 − F + αG2. (Eq. 3.16)
Correspondingly, the manufacturer’s profits can be expressed as
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + 2F − αG1 − αG2. (Eq. 3.17)
In this setting, the manufacturer declares the participation rate α along with the wholesale
price and fixed fees. Given this contract, the retailers simultaneously and independently
choose price and effort levels. Anticipating the retailer’s behavior, the manufacturer chooses
α, w and F to maximize his profits. Also, the manufacturer ensures that the retailers at least
make their reservation profits (assumed to be zero). Hence, the manufacturer’s optimization
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problem (denoted by [M-α]) can be stated as
Max Π
{w,F, p1, p2, e1, e2, α}
(Eq. 3.18)













The properties of the solution to [M-α] are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.3 The manufacturer can achieve the first best solution by choosing the par-






























The retail price (p1 = p2 = p
α = p∗) and the effort (e1 = e2 = e
α = e∗) that solve [M-α]
simultaneously satisfy the following equations
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) = 0, (Eq. 3.21)
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From Proposition 1, we can see that the retailer’s choice of effort is such that the difference
















Also, the retailer’s choice of price is such that the difference between the marginal benefit
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(p1 − c). (Eq. 3.24)











would result in DMRMCαp = DMRMC
fb
p = 0. Similarly, the manufacturer can choose a



















that will result in DMRMCαe = DMRMC
fb
e = 0.
We can show that as the manufacturer increases the wholesale price, the retailers increase
the retail price (∂p1
∂w
> 0) and decrease the retail effort (∂e1
∂w
< 0). On the other hand, as
the manufacturer increases the participation rate α, the retailers increase both the retail
price and effort (∂p1
∂α
> 0 and ∂e1
∂α
> 0). Hence, the manufacturer can choose an appropriate
wholesale price wα and participation rate α∗ that leads to the retailers choosing retail prices
and efforts that induce DMRMCαp = DMRMC
fb





Therefore, the use of a cooperative advertising contract that specifies a participation rate α
can induce the first best solution if the retailers are symmetric.
Recall that in the second best solution [M-SB], the manufacturer was unable to induce
the retailers to expend first best effort and price levels. This resulted from the fact that
the retailer’s marginal benefit from effort was less than the marginal benefit of effort to
the total channel. Hence, the retailer preferred to exert lower effort compared to the first
best. In contrast, when the manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising contract that
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only specifies a participation rate, the manufacturer reduces the retailers marginal cost of
advertising (compared to second best) and thereby induces the retailers to exert greater
effort. The participation rate is set such that the costs of the retailers are reimbursed
sufficiently enough to increase their effort to first best levels. Since the manufacturer can
coordinate the retail efforts using the participation rate, the retail prices are coordinated by
choosing the appropriate wholesale price.
3.4.3 Cooperative Advertising Contract That Includes a Participation Rate as
well as Variable Accruals
Under this contract, both retailers are reimbursed a fraction α of their advertising expenses
and this reimbursement is capped at a fraction (δ) of the wholesale receipts from the retailer
(δwQi). Given that the cost of advertising for the retailers is Gi, depending on the effort
levels exerted by the retailers, we can have αGi ≤ δwQi or αGi > δwQi. If retailers expend
effort such that αGi ≤ δwQi, then the retailers are reimbursed αGi by the manufacturer. On
the other hand, if retailers expend effort such that αGi > δwQi, then the total reimbursement
is only δwQi.
Therefore, the retail profits can be expressed as
π1 =
 Q
1(p1 − w)−G1 + αG1 − F if αG1 ≤ δwQ1




2(p2 − w)−G2 + αG2 − F if αG2 ≤ δwQ2
Q2(p2 − w)−G2 + δwQ2 − F if αG2 > δwQ2
 (Eq. 3.26)
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Correspondingly, the manufacturer’s profits can be expressed as
Π =
 Q
1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + 2F − αG1 − αG2 if αGi ≤ δwQi
Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + 2F − δwQ1 − δwQ2 if αGi > δwQi
 (Eq. 3.27)
In this setting, the manufacturer declares the participation rate α, the accrual rate δ, the
wholesale price w and the fixed fees F . Given this contract, the retailers simultaneously
and independently choose price and effort levels. Anticipating the retailer’s behavior, the
manufacturer chooses α, δ, w and F to maximize his profits. Hence, the manufacturer’s
optimization problem [PM − δ] can be expressed as
Max Π
{w,F, p1, p2, e1, e2, α, δ}
(Eq. 3.28)














The properties of the solution to [PM − δ] are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 3.4 When the manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising contract that in-
cludes an accrual rate δ and a participation rate α, the manufacturer can achieve the first

























































































is the cost of effort and Q1
∗
is the retail demand at first best
price and effort levles (p∗ and e∗).
When the retailers expend marketing effort such that the reimbursement through participa-
tion rate is greater than the cooperative dollars accrued, the retailers are only reimbursed























(p1 − (1− δ)w)−
∂G1
∂e1
= 0. (Eq. 3.36)
As we can see from the above equations, the cooperative dollars amount to a discount in
wholesale price. Since the cooperative dollars do not affect the retailer’s advertising costs, the
retailers continue to under invest in advertising. Hence, the manufacturer cannot achieve
the first best setting. Substituting w̃ = w(1 − δ), we can see that the solution to the
manufacturer’s problem in this case is identical to the second best setting. Next, when the
retailer choose to expend effort such that the reimbursement through participation rate is
less than the cooperative dollars accrued, the retailers are reimbursed αGi. In this scenario,
the retailer’s choice of price and effort are governed by the following first order conditions
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − w) +Q1 = 0, (Eq. 3.37)
∂Q1
∂e1
(p1 − w)− (1− α)
∂G1
∂e1
= 0. (Eq. 3.38)
We can see from the above equations that this solution is identical to the case where the
manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising contract that only includes a participation rate.
Hence, the results in proposition 1 apply here. In order for the manufacturer to induce this
solution, the manufacturer needs to choose an accrual rate δ such that the total cooperative
dollars accrued are greater than the reimbursement to the retailers ( δwQ1 > αG1). Hence,
the manufacturer can choose an appropriate participation rate α and a sufficiently high
accrual rate δ (as detailed in the first part of proposition 2) to achieve the first best solution.
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In addition, the retailers also have the option to expend advertising effort such that the
total reimbursement through the participation rate is equal to the total accrued advertising
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∂Q1
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) = 0, (Eq. 3.39)
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= 0, (Eq. 3.40)
δwQ1 − αG1 = 0. (Eq. 3.41)
Equation (Eq. 3.39) governs the retailers choice of price and equation (Eq. 3.41) governs
the retailers choice to effort. Since the retailer’s advertisement cost reimbursement is equal
to the total accruals, θ1 denotes the incremental value to the retailer from increasing the
total accrued cooperative dollars and is obtained by solving equation (Eq. 3.40). Hence, the
manufacturer can induce the retailer to charge first best prices (p∗) and expend first best
advertising levels (e∗) by choosing a wholesale price w and accrual rate δ such that equations
(Eq. 3.39) and (Eq. 3.41) are satisfied for p1 = p
∗ and e1 = e
∗.
Since the retailers would choose prices and efforts using equations (Eq. 3.39) and (Eq. 3.41)
only when the incremental value from increasing the total accrued dollars is positive (θ1 > 0),
the manufacturer must choose the appropriate levels of participation rate that would ensure
θ1 > 0. Since a low participation rate would require the retailers to expend large amounts of
advertising effort in order to reach the cap set by the accrual limit, the retailers would choose
to increase their advertising to levels that would meet the cap only for sufficiently high levels
of the participation rate. Hence, the manufacturer must ensure that the participation rate
is high enough to ensure θ1 > 0. Hence, the appropriate choice of δ, w and α (as noted in
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the second part of proposition 2) can achieve the first best solution. Note that since the
retailers are charged a fixed fee in addition to the wholesale price, the retail profits excluding
the fixed fee are higher when the retailers choose the solution leading to the first best prices
and advertising levels. Since the manufacturer extracts the retailer’s surplus using the fixed
fee, the retailer’s profits are identical under the three scenarios discussed above. Hence, the
retailers are likely to choose the scenario that leads to the first best solution.
3.4.4 Cooperative Advertising Contract That Includes a Participation Rate as
well as Fixed Accruals
Under this contract, both retailers are reimbursed a fraction α of their advertising expenses
and this reimbursement is capped at a fixed amount (A). Given that the cost of advertising
for the retailers is Gi, depending on the effort levels exerted by the retailers, we can have
αGi ≤ A or αGi > A. If retailers expend effort such that αGi ≤ A, then the retailers are
reimbursed αGi by the manufacturer. On the other hand, if retailers expend effort such that
αGi > A, then the total reimbursement is only A.
Therefore, the retail profits can be expressed as
π1 =
 Q
1(p1 − w)−G1 + αG1 − F if αG1 ≤ A




2(p2 − w)−G2 + αG2 − F if αG2 ≤ A
Q2(p2 − w)−G2 − F + A if αG2 > A
 (Eq. 3.43)
Correspondingly, the manufacturer’s profits can be expressed as
Π =
 Q
1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + 2F − αG1 − αG2 if αGi ≤ A
Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + 2F − 2A if αGi > A
 (Eq. 3.44)
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In this setting, the manufacturer declares the participation rate α, the accrual amount A
along with the wholesale price w and fixed fees F . Given this contract, the retailers si-
multaneously and independently choose price and effort levels. Anticipating the retailer’s
behavior, the manufacturer chooses α, A, w and F to maximize his profits. Hence, the
manufacturer’s optimization problem [PM − A] can be expressed as
Max Π
{w,F, p1, p2, e1, e2, α, A}
(Eq. 3.45)













The properties of the solution to [PM −A] are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 3.5 When the manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising contract that in-
cludes a fixed accrual rate A and a participation rate α, the manufacturer can achieve the











































































is the cost of effort and Q1
∗
is the retail demand at first best price and effort levles
(p∗ and e∗).
When the retailers expend marketing effort such that the reimbursement through partic-
ipation rate is greater than the cooperative dollars accrued, the retailers are only reimbursed










= 0. (Eq. 3.53)
As we can see from the above equations, the cooperative dollars do not impact the retailer’s
price and effort choices. Since the retailers are reimbursed a fixed amount A, the amount of
reimbursement does not affect the retailer’s marginal costs. Hence, the solution is identical
to the second best solution.
Next, when the retailer choose to expend effort such that the reimbursement through
participation rate is less than the cooperative dollars accrued, the retailers are reimbursed
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(p1 − w) +Q1 = 0, (Eq. 3.54)
∂Q1
∂e1
(p1 − w)− (1− α)
∂G1
∂e1
= 0. (Eq. 3.55)
We can see from the above equations that this solution is identical to the case where the
manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising contract that only includes a participation
rate. Hence, the results in proposition 1 apply here. In order for the manufacturer to induce
this solution, the manufacturer needs to choose the fixed accrual rate A such that the total
cooperative dollars accrued are greater than the reimbursement to the retailers ( A > αG1).
Hence, the manufacturer can choose an appropriate participation rate α and a sufficiently
high fixed accrual rate A (as detailed in the first part of proposition 2) to achieve the first
best solution.
In addition, the retailers also have the option to expend advertising effort such that the
total reimbursement through the participation rate is equal to the total accrued advertising




(p1 − w) +Q1 = 0, (Eq. 3.56)
∂Q1
∂e1









= 0, (Eq. 3.57)
A− αG1 = 0. (Eq. 3.58)
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Equation (Eq. 3.56) governs the retailers choice of price and equation (Eq. 3.58) governs
the retailers choice to effort. Since the retailer’s advertisement cost reimbursement is equal
to the total accruals, θ1 denotes the incremental value to the retailer from increasing the
total accrued cooperative dollars and is obtained by solving equation (Eq. 3.57). Hence, the
manufacturer can induce the retailer to charge first best prices (p∗) and expend first best
advertising levels (e∗) by choosing a wholesale price w and accrual rate A such that equations
(Eq. 3.56) and (Eq. 3.58) are satisfied for p1 = p
∗ and e1 = e
∗.
Since the retailers would choose prices and efforts using equations (Eq. 3.56) and (Eq. 3.58)
only when the incremental value from increasing the total accrued dollars is positive (θ1 > 0),
the manufacturer must choose the appropriate levels of participation rate that would ensure
θ1 > 0. Since a low participation rate would require the retailers to expend large amounts of
advertising effort in order to reach the cap set by the accrual limit, the retailers would choose
to increase their advertising to levels that would meet the cap on cooperative advertising
dollars only for sufficiently high levels of the participation rate. Hence, the manufacturer
must ensure that the participation rate is high enough to ensure θ1 > 0. Therefore, the
appropriate choice of A, w and α (as noted in the second part of proposition 2) can achieve
the first best solution. Note that since the retailers are charged a fixed fee in addition to the
wholesale price, the retail profits excluding the fixed fee are higher when the retailers choose
the solution leading to the first best prices and advertising levels. Since the manufacturer
extracts the retailer’s surplus using the fixed fee, the retailer’s profits are identical under the
three scenarios discussed above. Hence, the retailers are likely to choose the scenario that
leads to the first best solution.
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3.4.5 Comparing the Fixed and Variable Accruals
While the previous sections described how the two types of accrual rates, in conjunction with
the participation rate can induce the first best solution, each type of accrual rate has a very
different impact on the retailer’s price and effort choices. To understand these differences,
let us first investigate the fixed amount accrual rate. When the manufacturer uses the fixed
amount accrual rate to coordinate the channel, the first order conditions that govern the
retailer’s price and effort choices are given by
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − w) +Q1 = 0, (Eq. 3.59)
∂Q1
∂e1









= 0, (Eq. 3.60)
A− αG1 = 0. (Eq. 3.61)
Since the choice of advertising levels is governed by equation (Eq. 3.61), we can see that as
the fixed accrual amount is increased, the retailers increase their advertising levels. Also,
since the accrual amount is fixed and is not impacted by the choice of wholesale price,
advertising levels are not impacted by the choice of wholesale price. Next, the retailer’s
price levels are governed by equation (Eq. 3.59). As we can see from (Eq. 3.59), an increase
in the wholesale price leads to an increase in the price charged by the retailer. Also, since
an increase in advertising levels increases the marginal benefit of price, an increase in the
fixed accrual amount indirectly increases the retail prices through its effect on advertising
levels. With regards to the participation rate, we can see from equation (Eq. 3.61) that an
increase in the participation rate would reduce advertising levels. A higher participation rate
requires lower levels of advertising to satisfy equation (Eq. 3.61). Since prices are indirectly
affected by the effort levels, an increase in the participation rate also lowers prices. Hence,
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the comparative statics6 with respect to the wholesale price, participation rate and fixed



















When the manufacturer uses the accrual rate linked to wholesale receipts to coordinate




(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1
) = 0, (Eq. 3.62)
∂Q1
∂e1












= 0, (Eq. 3.63)
δwQ1 − αG1 = 0. (Eq. 3.64)
Since the choice of advertising levels is governed by equation (Eq. 3.64), we can see that an
increase in the accrual rate has a direct positive impact on the retailers advertising levels.
In addition to this direct impact of the accrual rate, the increase in accrual rate also impacts
the advertising levels indirectly through its impact on price and θ1. When an increase in
6Detailed proofs available in the appendix
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effort increases the reimbursement through the participation rate more than the increases in
the total accruals, the net impact of an increase in the accrual rate δ is an increase in the
retailer’s advertising levels.
In contrast to the impact of the accrual rate on the advertising levels, an increase in
the accrual rate (δ) has a direct negative impact on the retail prices. As the accrual rate
increases, the total cap on reimbursement increases. The retailers can also increase the cap
by decreasing the price. The reduction in price leads to greater demand and therefore higher
wholesale receipts and in turn higher cap on reimbursement. When the accrual rate is higher,
the marginal increase in the cap on reimbursements due to a reduction in price is greater
than when the accrual rate is lower. Hence, the retailers tend to decrease the retail prices.
The increase in the accrual rate also has an indirect positive impact on retail prices through
its positive direct impact on advertising levels. As advertisement levels go up, retailers can
increase prices to benefit from the increased demand from higher advertising. The increase
in the accrual rate also has an indirect impact on retail prices through its impact on θ1.











































the accrual rate has a net negative impact on retail prices. Similar arguments hold for the
comparative statics with respect to the participation rate and the wholesale price and the
various comparative statics results7 are listed below
• ∂p1
∂w








> 0 when ∆6 > 0,












< 0 when ∆5 < 0,
• ∂p1
∂δ
< 0 when ∆1 < 0,
• ∂e1
∂δ



















































































Comparing the impact of the fixed and variable accrual rates on retail prices, we can see that
while an increase in the fixed accrual rate also increases the retail prices, an increase in the
accrual rate linked to wholesale receipts can lead to a lowering of retail prices. Additionally,
while an increase in the wholesale price has no impact on advertising levels under the fixed
accrual rate contract, an increase in the wholesale price can lead to an increase in the adver-
tising levels under the accrual rate contract linked to wholesale receipts. These differences
stem from the fact that the retailers can alter the total cooperative dollars accrued under
the variable accrual rate contract by changing retail prices and advertising levels. Also, a
change in the wholesale price directly impacts the accrual dollars under this contract (in
contrast to having no impact on the accrual dollars under the fixed accrual rate contract).
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3.5 Conclusion
Cooperative advertising contracts are frequently used by manufacturers to induce retailers
to increase their advertising intensity. In this essay, we provide guidelines for the use of
various cooperative advertising strategies and detailed the conditions under which each type
of cooperative advertising contract can lead to greater profits to the manufacturer. While
previous research only considered a single type of cooperative advertising contract — one that
only includes a participation rate — in practice, we observe cooperative advertising contracts
that also include accruals that limit retailer reimbursement. While the various cooperative
advertising contracts can be used to achieve coordination, we have shown that each contract
has a unique effect of retail prices and efforts. We provide guidelines to manufacturers for
using each type of cooperative advertising contract to achieve channel coordination.
While this essay investigates a channel setting involving a manufacturer selling through
two symmetric retailers, downstream retailers may be asymmetric. This asymmetry may
arise due to differences in cost and demand parameters. Hence, in the next essay, we extend
our analysis to include asymmetric retailers.
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CHAPTER 4: COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING WITH
ASYMMETRIC RETAILERS
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we investigated the use of various cooperative advertising contracts
by a manufacturer selling through two symmetric retailers. Downstream retailers may be
symmetric when there is little or no differentiation between the retailers and/or when the
customer segments that these retailers serve are similar. While symmetric retailers are plausi-
ble, downstream retailer asymmetry is more likely to arise when selling to multiple retailers
who differentiate themselves from the competition. Retailer asymmetry can arise due to
several sources. Retailers may have different cost structures that may result in asymmetric
pricing and advertising behavior. Also, retailers may differ in their target customer seg-
ments’ size and/or valuations of the products sold and these segment differences will result
in the retailers facing asymmetric demand. As Iyer (1998) notes, retail differentiation has
important implications for upstream manufacturers and extant literature seldom accounts
for such asymmetry in investigating channel issues. The use of a ‘one size fits all’ strategy
that works well under symmetry may fail under asymmetry.
This chapter investigates the effectiveness of cooperative advertising contracts in coordi-
nating the channel in the presence of asymmetric downstream retailers. While these contracts
allow the manufacturer to coordinate the channel when retailers are symmetric, we find that
coordination can be achieved in the presence of asymmetry only when stringent conditions
are met. As in the previous chapter, we compare three types of cooperative advertising con-
tracts: contracts that only include a participation rate, contracts that include a participation
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rate as well as variable accruals and contracts that include a participation rate as well as
a fixed accrual. While all three types of contracts can coordinate the channel under very
stringent conditions, contracts that include some form of accrual can coordinate the channel
under less stringent conditions compared to the contract that only includes a participation
rate. When the cooperative advertising contract includes accruals, the manufacturer can use
the accrual amount to coordinate the efforts of one retailer while using the participation rate
to coordinate the other retailer’s efforts.
Since the conditions for achieving coordination using a cooperative advertising are strin-
gent, they are less likely to be satisfied. When coordination cannot be achieved, we compare
the relative attractiveness of the three types of contracts. Since the manufacturer can con-
trol retail efforts with two instruments (participation rate and the accrual), contracts that
include some form of accruals are superior to contracts that only include a participation
rate. Amongst the contracts that include accruals, using a variable accrual contract may be
preferred to the fixed accrual contract under certain conditions and vice versa. The two type
of accruals impact retail prices and advertising levels in distinct ways and these differences
may tip the scale in favor of one contract versus the other contract under the appropriate
circumstances. In what follows, these conditions and the intuition behind the results are
discussed in detail.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section develops the model,
section 3 presents our analysis and results while the final section concludes the paper. All
proofs are confined to an appendix.
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4.2 The Model
We first describe the model that incorporates no cooperative advertising strategies and later
discuss how the basic model changes with the use of cooperative advertising contracts. We
consider a single manufacturer M that sells its products through two retailers R1 and R2.
The demand faced by retailers R1 and R2 is denoted by Q1 = Q1(p1, p2, e1, e2) and Q
2 =
















∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j(Eq. 4.1)
Where pi and ei are the price charged and effort (advertising) expended by retailer R
i. The




> 0 and ∂
2Gi
∂e2i
> 0). Note that here we assume that the manufacturer sells to two
asymmetric retailers. The manufacturer sells the products to retailer Ri at a wholesale price
w and also charges a fixed fee1 F i. Hence, the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)−G1 − F 1, (Eq. 4.2)
π2 = Q2(p2 − wt)−G2 − F 2. (Eq. 4.3)
The manufacturer’s profits can be expressed as
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2. (Eq. 4.4)
1Here, we assume that the manufacturer is able to charge two separate fixed fees. The assumption of
two separate fixed fees allows us to investigate the incentives created by the use of a cooperative advertising
contract in a simpler setting, without having to consider rent extraction issues. In order to resolve both the
rent extraction incentive and the incentive to improve retail efforts requires the use of a specific demand
formulation. Also, O’Brien and Shaffer (1994) note that manufacturers may use a two-part tariff that
includes a single wholesale price and separate fixed fees for each retailer.
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where c is the per unit cost incurred by the manufacturer. The manufacturer acts as a
Stackelberg leader and sets the wholesale price and fixed fees for the product before the
retailers set retail prices and effort levels. Given a wholesale price set by the manufacturer,
the retailers simultaneously and independently choose retail price and effort levels in order
to maximize their profits. The manufacturer anticipates the retailers’ actions and choose the
wholesale prices and fixed fees in order to maximize his profits, taking into consideration the
retailers actions.
We begin by understand the manufacturer’s choices under a vertically integrated channel
(where the manufacturer makes the pricing and effort decisions). We denote this setting as
the first best setting. The retail profits under vertical integration are given by
π1 = Q1(p1 − c)−G1, (Eq. 4.5)
π2 = Q2(p2 − c)−G2. (Eq. 4.6)
Since the manufacturer owns both the retail channels, the manufacturer’s profits can be
expressed as
Π = π1 + π2 = Q1(p1 − c) +Q2(p2 − c)−G1 −G2. (Eq. 4.7)
The manufacturer’s optimization problem (denoted by [M-FB]) can be expressed as
Max Π = Q1(p1 − c) +Q2(p2 − c)−G1 −G2
{p1, p2, e1, e2}
(Eq. 4.8)
The properties of the solution2 to [M-FB] are summarized in the following Lemma.
2All proofs are relegated to the appendix
71
Lemma 4.6 The retail price (p1 = p
∗
1, p2 = p
∗
2) and the effort (e1 = e
∗
1, e2 = e
∗
1) that solve
[M-FB] simultaneously satisfy the following equations
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 = 0 (Eq. 4.9)
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +Q2 = 0 (Eq. 4.10)
∂Q1
∂e1






= 0 (Eq. 4.11)
∂Q1
∂e2






= 0 (Eq. 4.12)
From equations (Eq. 4.9)-(Eq. 4.12), we can see that the manufacturer chooses price and
effort such that the difference between the total marginal benefit(to the entire channel) from
price/effort and the total marginal cost(to the entire channel) of price/effort, denoted by
DMRMCfbi ∀i ∈ {p, e} is equal to zero (DMRMCfbp = 0 and DMRMCfbe = 0). In the
next section, we consider the independent retailer case where the retailers make the price and
effort choices while the manufacturer decides the wholesale price and fixed fees, in addition
to any cooperative advertising that the manufacturer may offer.
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4.3 Analysis and Results
In this section, we investigate channel settings where the manufacturer sells through two
independent retailers who make the retail price and effort decisions. In this context, we
investigate scenarios where 1) there is no cooperative advertising contract offered to the
retailers 2) the retailers are offered a cooperative advertising contract that only includes a
participation rate 3) the retailers are offered a cooperative advertising contract that includes
a participation rate as well as an accrual rate that is set as a fraction of the wholesale
receipts and 4) the retailers are offered a cooperative advertising contract that includes a
participation rate as well as an accrual rate that is set as a fixed amount. We compare
these channel settings with that of the vertical integration (first best) case to understand
the effectiveness of the cooperative advertising contract in achieving the first best outcomes.
4.3.1 Independent Retailers with No Cooperative Advertising
In this case, while the manufacturer charges a wholesale price and a fixed fee, there is no
cooperative advertising contract offered to the retailers. We denote this case as the ‘second
best’ case. The retail profits under this setting are given by equations (Eq. 4.2)-(Eq. 4.3) and
the manufacturer’s profits are given by (Eq. 4.4). The manufacturer chooses the wholesale
prices and fixed fees while anticipating the retailer’s responses to these choices. Also, the
manufacturer ensures that the retailers at least make their reservation profits (assumed to be




{w,F 1, F 2, p1, p2, e1, e2}
(Eq. 4.13)













The properties of the solution to [M-SB] are summarized in the following Lemma.




(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (Eq. 4.14)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (Eq. 4.15)
∂Q1
∂e1









(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p2 − c) (Eq. 4.16)
∂Q2
∂e2









(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂e2
(p1 − c) (Eq. 4.17)
where p1 = p̂1 and p2 = p̂2 are the prices charged, e1 = ê1 and e2 = ê2 are the efforts
expended by the two asymmetric independent retail outlets. The manufacturer’s profits under
the second best setting are lower than the first best profits (Π̂ < Π∗).
From lemma 2, we can see that the retailer’s choice of effort is such that the difference




(w − c) + ∂Q2
∂e1
(p1 − c) > 0 ∀w > c). Also, the retailer’s choice of




(w − c) + ∂Q2
∂p1







DMRMCsbp = 0 but since w > c, we have DMRMC
sb




DMRMCsbp cannot be zero at the same time. Hence, the first best cannot be achieved.
Also, as the manufacturer increases the wholesale price, the price charged by the retailer
increases3 (∂p1
∂w
> 0) and the effort expended by the retailer decreases (∂e1
∂w
< 0). Since the
manufacturer has only one instrument (the wholesale price) to control both the price and
effort charged by the retailers, and since the wholesale price has an opposite effect on price
and effort, first best profits cannot be achieved.
In the next section, we investigate the impact of a cooperative advertising contract that
only specifies a participation rate.
4.3.2 Cooperative Advertising Contract That Specifies a Participation Rate
With No Accrual Rate Specified
When the manufacturer uses a cooperative advertising contract that only specifies a partic-
ipation rate, both retailers are reimbursed a fraction α of their advertising expenses. Hence,
the retail profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)−G1 − F 1 + αG1, (Eq. 4.18)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)−G2 − F 2 + αG2. (Eq. 4.19)
Correspondingly, the manufacturer’s profits can be expressed as
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − αG1 − αG2. (Eq. 4.20)
In this setting, the manufacturer declares the participation rate α along with the wholesale
price and fixed fees. Given this contract, the retailers simultaneously and independently
choose price and effort levels. Anticipating the retailer’s behavior, the manufacturer chooses
3See appendix for the proof.
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α, w and F to maximize his profits. Also, the manufacturer ensures that the retailers at least
make their reservation profits (assumed to be zero). Hence, the manufacturer’s optimization
problem (denoted by [M-α]) can be stated as
Max Π
{w,F 1, F 2, p1, p2, e1, e2, α}
(Eq. 4.21)













The properties of the solution to [M-α] are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4.6 The manufacturer can simultaneously induce both the retailers (R1 and
R2) to exert first best efforts (e∗1 and e
∗
















































When the above conditions are not satisfied, the manufacturer cannot use the wholesale price
(w) and participation rate (α) induce the retailers to charge first best prices and exert first
best efforts.
When the manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising contract that includes a participation





(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (Eq. 4.24)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (Eq. 4.25)
∂Q1
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As we can see from equation (Eq. 4.24), the manufacturer can induce R1 to exert first best
price by choosing the wholesale price such that
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1







Similarly, we can see from equation (Eq. 4.25) that the manufacturer can induce R2 to exert
first best price by choosing the wholesale price such that
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2







Since the manufacturer can only charge a single wholesale price, in order for the manufacturer


























Hence, the manufacturer can induce the retailers to charge first best prices only when equa-
tion (Eq. 4.30) is satisfied. Next, we can see from equation (Eq. 4.26) that the manufacturer
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Similarly, we can see from equation (Eq. 4.27) that the manufacturer can induce R2 to exert




























Since the manufacturer must offer the same participation rate to both the retailers, in order































Hence, only when equations (Eq. 4.30) and (Eq. 4.33) are simultaneously satisfied, the man-
ufacturer can induce the first best prices and efforts. When the retailers are symmetric,
equations (Eq. 4.30) and (Eq. 4.33) are always satisfied, and the manufacturer achieves the
first best profits. When the retailers are asymmetric, the marginal benefits of price and effort
and the corresponding marginal costs are different for each retailer. Hence, the incentives
(wholesale price and participation rate) that are required to induce first best price and effort
levels differ for each retailer. Only when equations (Eq. 4.30) and (Eq. 4.33) are satisfied,
the manufacturer can simultaneously induce both retailers to charge first best prices and
exert first best effort levels.
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In the next section, we investigate a cooperative advertising contract that includes an
accrual rate in addition to a participation rate. In this setting, the total reimbursements
that the retailers can get from the manufacturer are limited to a fraction (δ) of the whole-
sale receipts from the retailer. Since the limit on reimbursement is affected by both the
manufacturer and retailer choices, the total accruals to the retailers is variable.
4.3.3 Cooperative Advertising Contract That Includes a Participation Rate as
well as Variable Accruals
Under this contract, both retailers are reimbursed a fraction α of their advertising expenses
and this reimbursement is capped at a fraction (δ) of the wholesale receipts from the retailer
(δwQi). Since the wholesale receipts are affected by the wholesale price, retail price as well
as effort, the total accrual is dependent on the choices of both the manufacturer and the
retailer. Given that the cost of advertising for the retailers is Gi, depending on the effort
levels exerted by the retailers, we can have αGi ≤ δwQi or αGi > δwQi. If retailers expend
effort such that αGi ≤ δwQi, then the retailers are reimbursed αGi by the manufacturer. On
the other hand, if retailers expend effort such that αGi > δwQi, then the total reimbursement
is only δwQi.
Therefore, the retail profits can be expressed as
π1 =
 Q
1(p1 − w)−G1 + αG1 − F 1 if αG1 ≤ δwQ1




2(p2 − w)−G2 + αG2 − F 2 if αG2 ≤ δwQ2
Q2(p2 − w)−G2 + δwQ2 − F 2 if αG2 > δwQ2
 (Eq. 4.35)
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Correspondingly, the manufacturer’s profits can be expressed as
Π =
 Q
1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − αG1 − αG2 if αGi ≤ δwQi
Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − δwQ1 − δwQ2 if αGi > δwQi

(Eq. 4.36)
In this setting, the manufacturer declares the participation rate α, the accrual rate δ, the
wholesale price w and the fixed fees F 1 and F 2. Given this contract, the retailers simultane-
ously and independently choose price and effort levels. Anticipating the retailer’s behavior,
the manufacturer chooses α, δ, w, F 1 and F 2 to maximize his profits. Hence, the manufac-
turer’s optimization problem [PM − δ] can be expressed as
Max Π
{w,F 1, F 2, p1, p2, e1, e2, α, δ}
(Eq. 4.37)














The properties of the solution to [PM − δ] are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 4.7 The manufacturer can induce both the asymmetric retailers to charge first
best prices and exert first best effort levels under the following three scenarios
(i) The demand parameters for the asymmetric retailers are such that the conditions listed
in proposition 1 are satisfied and the manufacturer chooses a very high accrual rate (δ)





). In this case, the manufacturer only uses the participation
rate and the wholesale price to coordinate the channel.
(ii) The demand parameters of the asymmetric retailers are such that the following condi-



































































denote the demand faced
by the retailers when exerting first best efforts (e∗1, e
∗






denote the cost of effort incurred by the retailers when exerting
first best effort levles.
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(iii) The demand parameters of the asymmetric retailers are such that the following condi-









































∗ −G2∗Q1∗ ≥ 0 (Eq. 4.43)










The manufacturer can set a very high accrual rate δ (and a low participation rate α)such
that both the retailers expend marketing effort such that their reimbursement through the
participation rate is less than the total accruals. In this scenario, the retailers are reimbursed
αGi. Here, the participation rate is the only parameter that influences retail behavior.
Hence, when conditions4 listed in proposition 1 are satisfied, the manufacturer can induce
the retailers to exert first best efforts and charge first best prices.
Alternatively, the manufacturer can5 set a lower accrual rate δ ( and a higher partic-
ipation rate α) such that both the retailers may expend marketing effort such that their
reimbursement through the participation rate is equal to the cooperative dollars accrued. In
this case, the manufacturer uses the accrual rate to influence retail effort and the wholesale
price to influence retail prices. Since the manufacturer charges a single wholesale price, the
following condition must be satisfied in order to induce both retailers to charge first best
4See appendix for proof.



















Also, in order for the manufacturer to induce both retailers to exert effort such that
their reimbursement through the participation rate is equal to their accruals, the following





























Hence, when the conditions in (Eq. 4.44)-(Eq. 4.46) are simultaneously satisfied, the manu-
facturer can induce both the retailers to charge first best prices and exert first best efforts.
Alternatively, the manufacturer can choose the participation rate and the accrual rate
such that one retailer ( say, R1) expends effort such that his reimbursement through the
participation rate is lower than the total accrual and the other retailer (R2) expends effort
such that his reimbursement through the participation rate is equal to the total accruals.









Here, the manufacturer can use the participation rate to influence R1’s effort and can use
the accrual rate to influence R2’s effort. The manufacturer then uses the single wholesale
price to influence retail prices of both R1 and R2. The single wholesale price can induce

















In order for the manufacturer to be able to induce R1 to exert effort such that R1’s re-
imbursement less than the accruals while R2’s reimbursement is equal to R2’s accrual, the



























∗ −G2∗Q1∗ ≥ 0 (Eq. 4.49)
Hence, when conditions (Eq. 4.47)-(Eq. 4.49) are simultaneously satisfied, the manufacturer
can induce first best efforts and prices.
In addition to the above described strategies, the manufacturer can offer a very low ac-
crual rate δ that can induce one or both retailers to exert effort such that their reimbursement
through the participation rate is greater than the accruals. In this scenario, the retailers are
reimbursed δwQi. Since this reimbursement amounts to a reduction in wholesale price, the
manufacturer cannot induce the retailer to exert first best efforts. Hence, the manufacturer
would prefer not to offer a very low accrual rate.
When the asymmetry between the retailers is such that the conditions listed in propo-
sition 2 are not satisfied, the manufacturer cannot simultaneously induce both the retailers
to exert first efforts and prices. In the next section, we investigate a cooperative advertising
contract that includes a participation rate and a fixed accrual amount.
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4.3.4 Cooperative Advertising Contract That Includes a Participation Rate as
well as a Fixed Accrual
Under this contract, both retailers are reimbursed a fraction α of their advertising expenses
and this reimbursement is capped at a fixed amount (A). Given that the cost of advertising
for the retailers is Gi, depending on the effort levels exerted by the retailers, we can have
αGi ≤ A or αGi > A. If retailers expend effort such that αGi ≤ A, then the retailers are
reimbursed αGi by the manufacturer. On the other hand, if retailers expend effort such that
αGi > A, then the total reimbursement is only A.
Therefore, the retail profits can be expressed as
π1 =
 Q
1(p1 − w)−G1 + αG1 − F 1 if αG1 ≤ A




2(p2 − w)−G2 + αG2 − F 2 if αG2 ≤ A
Q2(p2 − w)−G2 − F 2 + A if αG2 > A
 (Eq. 4.51)
Correspondingly, the manufacturer’s profits can be expressed as
Π =
 Q
1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − αG1 − αG2 if αGi ≤ A
Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − 2A if αGi > A
 (Eq. 4.52)
In this setting, the manufacturer declares the participation rate α, the accrual amount A
along with the wholesale price w and the fixed fees F 1 and F 2. Given this contract, the
retailers simultaneously and independently choose price and effort levels. Anticipating the
retailer’s behavior, the manufacturer chooses α, A, w, F 1 and F 2 to maximize his profits.
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Hence, the manufacturer’s optimization problem [PM − A] can be expressed as
Max Π
{w,F 1, F 2, p1, p2, e1, e2, α, A}
(Eq. 4.53)













The properties of the solution to [PM −A] are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 4.8 The manufacturer can induce both the asymmetric retailers to charge first
best prices and exert first best effort levels under the following three scenarios
(i) The demand parameters for the asymmetric retailers are such that the conditions listed
in proposition 1 are satisfied and the manufacturer chooses a very high fixed accrual (A)
such that the total reimbursement to either of the retailers is less than each retailer’s
accrual (A > αGi
∗
). In this case, the manufacturer only uses the participation rate
and the wholesale price to coordinate the channel.
(ii) The demand parameters of the asymmetric retailers are such that the following condi-











































denote the demand faced by the retailers when exerting first best
efforts (e∗1, e
∗







denote the cost of
effort incurred by the retailers when exerting first best effort levles.
(iii) The demand parameters of the asymmetric retailers are such that the following condi-





































∗ ≥ G2∗ (Eq. 4.59)
The manufacturer can use the wholesale price, the participation rate α and the fixed accrual
amount A to influence retail price and effort levels. The manufacturer can set a very high
accrual A (and a low participation rate α) such that both the retailers expend marketing
effort such that their reimbursement through the participation rate is less than the total
accruals. In this scenario, the retailers are reimbursed αGi. Here, the participation rate is
the only parameter that influences retail efforts while the wholesale price is used to influence
retail price. Hence, when conditions listed in proposition 1 are satisfied, the manufacturer
can induce the retailers to exert first best efforts and charge first best prices.
Alternatively, the manufacturer can set a lower accrual amount A ( and a higher par-
ticipation rate α) such that both the retailers may expend marketing effort such that their
reimbursement through the participation rate is equal to the cooperative dollars accrued. In
this case, the manufacturer uses the accrual rate to influence retail effort and the wholesale
price to influence retail prices. Since the manufacturer charges a single wholesale price, the
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Also, in order for the manufacturer to induce both retailers to exert effort such that
their reimbursement through the participation rate is equal to their accruals, the following


























Hence, when the conditions in (Eq. 4.60)-(Eq. 4.62) are simultaneously satisfied, the manu-
facturer can induce both the retailers to charge first best prices and exert first best efforts.
Alternatively, the manufacturer can choose the participation rate and the accrual amount
such that one retailer ( say, R1) expends effort such that his reimbursement through the
participation rate is lower than the total accrual and the other retailer (R2) expends effort
such that his reimbursement through the participation rate is equal to the total accruals.
In this setting, while R1 is reimbursed αG1 < A, R2 is reimbursed αG2 = A. Here, the
manufacturer can use the participation rate to influence R1’s effort and can use the accrual
amount to influence R2’s effort. The manufacturer then uses the single wholesale price to
influence retail prices of both R1 and R2. The single wholesale price can induce both the
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In order for the manufacturer to be able to induce R1 to exert effort such that R1’s re-
imbursement less than the accruals while R2’s reimbursement is equal to R2’s accrual, the

























∗ ≥ G2∗ (Eq. 4.65)
Hence, when conditions (Eq. 4.63)-(Eq. 4.65) are simultaneously satisfied, the manufacturer
can induce first best efforts and prices.
In addition to the above described strategies, the manufacturer can offer a very low
accrual amount A that can induce one or both retailers to exert effort such that their reim-
bursement through the participation rate is greater than the accruals. In this scenario, the
retailers are reimbursed A. Since this reimbursement amounts is fixed, the retailers marginal
costs are not altered by the reimbursement and hence will not influence retail behavior.
Therefore, the manufacturer would not prefer to offer a very low accrual amount A.
When the asymmetry between the retailers is such that the conditions listed in proposi-
tion 3 are not satisfied, the manufacturer cannot simultaneously induce both the retailers to
exert first efforts and prices.
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In the next section, we investigate the conditions under which the use of variable accruals
may be preferred to the use of fixed accruals when either of the contracts cannot achieve the
first best solution (i.e., when the conditions in propositions 2 and 3 are not satisfied).
4.3.5 Comparing the Fixed and Variable Accrual Contracts
While the previous sections described how the two types of accrual rates, in conjunction
with the participation rate can induce the first best solution, the conditions required for
each contract to achieve the first best solution are less likely to be satisfied when the re-
tailers are asymmetric. In the previous chapter, we noted that each type of accrual has a
significantly different impact on retail prices and efforts than the other contract. When the
manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising contract that includes a participation rate and
variable accruals, the manufacturer can use the accrual rate δ to coordinate the efforts of
one retailer (say R1) and use the participation rate α to coordinate the efforts of the other
retailer (R2). In this context, the comparative statics of retail price and effort are given by
• ∂p1
∂w








> 0 when ∆6 > 0,
• ∂p1
∂α








< 0 when ∆5 < 0,
• ∂p1
∂δ
< 0 when ∆1 < 0,
• ∂e1
∂δ











































































































































When the manufacturer uses a cooperative advertising contract that includes a fixed accrual,
the manufacturer can use the fixed accrual A to coordinate the efforts of one retailer (say
R1) and use the participation rate α to coordinate the efforts of the other retailer (R2). In



























As we can see from the above comparative statics, the fixed and variable accrual contracts
can have a significantly different impact on retail prices and efforts. Hence, when the man-
ufacturer cannot achieve the first best solution using either of these contract, the following
proposition notes the conditions under which one contract may be preferred to the other.
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Proposition 4.9 The manufacturer would prefer the variable accrual contract over the fixed










< 0, (Eq. 4.70)
∆1 < 0,∆5 < 0 and ∆6 > 0 (Eq. 4.71)
where pα1 is the retail price charged by R1 under a cooperative advertising contract that only
includes a participation rate.
When the own effort and cross effort effects on the retailer’s demand are high and when
the cost of effort is low, the manufacturer using a cooperative advertising contract that only
includes a participation rate may induce the retailers to charge prices that are greater than
the first best prices. Since the manufacturer uses the participation rate to increase retail
efforts, and since the participation rate also increases retail prices, the manufacturer may find
it profitable to induce retail prices that are greater than first best levels. In this context, since
the retailers are asymmetric, the manufacturer can use an additional instrument (accruals)
to better coordinate retail efforts. The question then arises as to which accrual contract
would result in greater profits.
As we can see from the comparative statics results, while both types of accruals have
a similar effect on R2’s prices and efforts, an increase in the accrual rate δ induces R1’s
to lower his price (when ∆1 < 0) while an increase in the fixed accrual A induces R1 to
increase his price. Hence, when the manufacturer, using a participation rate only contract,
prefers to induces R1 to exert prices greater than first best levels, the addition of the variable
accrual rate to the contract induces the retailers to charge prices closer to first best levels. In
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addition, under the variable accrual contract, an increase in the wholesale price may induce
(when ∆6 > 0) R1 to increase his effort levels. A similar increase in wholesale price under
the fixed accrual contract would induce R1 to lower his effort levels.
Hence, the manufacturer, by using the variable accrual contract, can simultaneously
induce R1’s price and effort levels to be more closer to the corresponding first best levels
compared to the case where only a participation rate contract is used. This cannot be
achieved using the fixed accrual contract. In fact, the retail prices and efforts of R1 are
further way from the first best levels under the fixed accrual contract compared to the
participation rate only contract. Since R2’s efforts are coordinated using the participation
rate, and since the impact of the participation rate and wholesale price on R2’s choices are
identical under the two types of accruals, using either of the contracts will not change R2’s
effort and price choices. Hence, when the conditions listed in proposition 3 are satisfied, the
manufacturer prefers the variable accrual contract over the fixed accrual contract.
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4.4 Conclusion
Cooperative advertising contracts are frequently used by manufacturers to induce retailers
to increase their advertising intensity. In this essay, we provided guidelines for the use
of various cooperative advertising strategies and detailed the conditions under which each
type of cooperative advertising contract can lead to greater profits to the manufacturer.
When dealing with asymmetric retailers, the manufacturer can achieve coordination only
when stringent conditions are met. When such conditions are not met, the manufacturer
may prefer one type of cooperative advertising to the other. The preference of the type
of contract depends to the nature of asymmetry and the extent of free-riding amongst the
retailers. Hence, manufacturers designing cooperative advertising contracts must take these
considerations into account.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS FOR RESULTS IN CHAPTER 2
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Proof of Lemma 1 (First Best Setting)
Recalling IRkL, IR
k
H and equation (Eq. 2.1) from the main text, the principal’s problem in




subject to πkm|m ≥ 0 ∀ k ∈ {A,B},m ∈ {L,H} (IRkm)
The Lagrangian for [P-FB] is given by:
L = φAHE[T
A


















































































































































































































From equations (A7)-(A14), we can see that λ1 = φ
A
L, λ2 = φ
A
H, λ3 = φ
B
L and λ4 = φ
B
H .








− δ ⇒ ekH = θkH(θkH + δ). (A20)
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and the statement of the Lemma 1 follows. 
Proof of Lemma 2 (Input Monitoring Setting)
Here, the partner can commit to a certain effort level while misrepresenting its private
information. For example, a partner in the high (or more favorable) state could lie and
report a low state and thereby be required to exert a lower effort level (corresponding to the













































− E[T kL ]. (A26)





and ICB,IL are not likely to bind at the solution. Accordingly, we focus on the setting where






H and refer to that ‘reduced’ problem
6We assume that each partner reports its private information as a best response to the other partner
reporting its private information truthfully.
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are indeed satisfied at the solution to [P-IM-R]. The Lagrangian for [P-IM-R] is:
L = φAHE[T
A






















































































































































































































































































































































+ δφBH = 0. (A51)































H + δ). (A55)
Using equations (A44)-(A47), we note that the inequalities in equations (A40)-(A43) will




























− E[T k,IL ]
)
= 0. (A57)
Solving equations (A56)-(A57) for the optimal transfers, gives:


































From equations (A58)-(A59) we can see that the principal extracts all rents from the partners

































Notice that the rents have two components : 1) rent due to extra output [ekLθ
k
H − ekLθkL] and











. Next, inspecting equations (A54)-(A55)
and (A19)-(A20) we can see that under input monitoring, the principal induces the partners
in the lower state to exert lower effort than in the first best scenario, while the partners





L conditions indeed hold at the above solution. Using the transfer payments in
equations (A58)-(A59) and the expressions for the partner’s profits in equations (A23)-(A26),
and noting that ekH > e
k

































πA,IL|L − πA,IH|L = (eA,IH − eA,IL )(θAH − θAL) +





⇒ πA,IL|L > πA,IH|L, and (A64)
πB,IL|L − πB,IH|L = (eB,IH − eB,IL )(θBH − θBL ) +





⇒ πB,IL|L > πB,IH|L. (A65)
Hence, the solution to [P-IM-R] is also a solution to [P-IM] and the statement of Lemma 2
follows. 
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Proof of Lemma 3 (Output Monitoring Setting)
Here, the principal specifies and monitors the output produced by the partner. Given the



























































































L ) + δ
2φAL(Q
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Hence, given a set of outputs, the principal can choose a set of effort levels that will result
in the desired output levels. In what follows, we will assume that the principal monitors the
output and specifies the required input for the partners. This allows for easy comparison of
input and output monitoring.
Under output monitoring, a partner in state m can lie to the principal and claim to be in
state n (where m,n ∈ {L,H},m 6= n). When partner k declares to be in state n and given
a particular effort level by partner l (denoted by el), the principal would require partner k
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to produce Q(ekn, e





l. For instance, if partner k is in the higher state but
reports to be in the lower state, the required output will be: Q(ekL, e





















< ekL. Similarly, we can





> ekH. Hence, the partners’ profits under the various state-disclosure
























































− E[T kL ]. (A77)
As in the input monitoring setting, here too, since the partners can lie, the principal needs
to design the contract (effort/transfer payment pair) such that truthful revelation is induced
while guaranteeing reservation utility to the partners. Recalling [P-OM] from the main text,














automatically satisfied at the solution to [P-OM-R]. The Lagrangian for [P-OM-R] is:
L = φAHE[T
A


















































































































































































































































































































































































+ φBHδ = 0. (A102)



































H + δ). (A106)
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Solving equations (A107)-(A108) for the transfer payments, gives:




































From equations (A109)-(A110) notice that the principal extracts all rents from either partner
in the lower state while either partner (i.e., A and/or B) in the higher state accrues rents
RA,OH and R
B,O












































































































. Next, inspecting equations (A105)-
(A106) and (A19)-(A20) we can see that the partner in the higher state is induced to exert
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the first best effort levels while the partner in the lower state is induced to exert lower effort
than in the first best setting.






L conditions indeed hold at the
above solution. Using the transfer payments in equations (A109)-(A110) and the expressions
for the partner’s profits in equations (A74)-(A77), and noting that ek,OH > e
k,O
































πA,OL|L − πA,OH|L =
[(θAH)





⇒ πA,OL|L > πA,OH|L, and (A115)
πB,OL|L − πB,OH|L =
[(θBH)





⇒ πB,OL|L > πB,OH|L . (A116)
Hence, the solution to [P-OM-R] is also a solution to [P-OM] and the statement of Lemma
3 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 1 (Comparing Input and Output Monitoring)
We begin by noting that the principal can induce the optimal effort levels of output monitor-
ing under input monitoring with appropriate transfers (recall that ek,Om represent the optimal
effort levels under output monitoring). More specifically, the following transfers under input
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monitoring will induce the partner to exert effort that is optimal under output monitoring.


































































The transfer payments for the output monitoring case are given by














































































































































Since the above two sets of transfers (from equations (A117)-(A120) and (A121)-(A124))
induce the same levels of effort under the two monitoring regimes, we now compare the
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principal’s profits under input monitoring and output monitoring (with output optimal ef-
fort levels under both cases). Let ΠP,I(eA,O, eB,O) denote the principal’s profit under in-
put monitoring when the principal induces the optimal effort levels under output moni-
toring. Further, let ΠP,I(eA,I, eB,I) and ΠP,O(eA,O, eB,O) denote the principal’s profit under
output and input monitoring respectively when the principal induces the partners to exert
the corresponding optimal effort levels. Notice that ΠP,I(eA,I, eB,I) ≥ ΠP,I(eA,O, eB,O) since
eA,I and eB,I are optimal under input monitoring. Hence, if the principal’s profit is higher
under input monitoring when the principal induces output optimal effort levels, then the
principal’s profit is higher with input monitoring under input optimal effort levels (i.e., if
ΠP,I(eA,O, eB,O) ≥ ΠP,O(eA,O, eB,O), then ΠP,I(eA,I, eB,I) ≥ ΠP,O(eA,O, eB,O)).
Comparing the principals’ profits (using the transfer payments in (A117)-(A120) and
(A121)-(A124)), we see that the transfer payments are identical under the low state condition




























− eB,OL (θBH − θBL ). (A126)
Then,































































Recalling eA,OL from (A105), notice that ∆


























⇒δ > 2 [(θ
A
H)









Hence, when the externality parameter δ satisfies inequality (A129), transfer payments from
partner A under input monitoring are greater than the payments under output monitoring.
A similar exercise results in the following condition for the principal’s profits from partner
B under input monitoring to be greater than those under output monitoring
δ >
2 [(θBH)









Since the principal’s profits are the sum of the transfer payments from both the partners,
the following inequality is a sufficient condition for input monitoring to be more profitable
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than output monitoring.
δ > δ∗ = max
{
2 [(θAH)





















Hence, the statement of Proposition 1 follows. We now show how our analysis extends to
more general demand and cost functions.
Extending the Analysis to a More General Setting
Here, we show that the qualitative insights arrived at so far also hold for a larger class of
demand and cost functions. Recall that the general demand for partner k, Q(ekm, e
l, θkm),
satisfies the conditions Q1 > 0, Q2 > 0, Q3 > 0, Q11 ≤ 0 and Q13 ≥ 0; and the cost function
C(ekm, θ
k
m), satisfies C1 > 0, C2 < 0, C11 > 0 and C12 < 0 . Using the same solution procedure
employed with the specific functions, we can show7 that the first order conditions (for agent








L)− φkLQ2(el,IL , E[ek,I], θlL) + φkH [Q1(ek,IL , E[el,I], θkH)− C1(ek,IL , θkH)]








H)−Q2(el,IL , E[ek,I], θlL)
− φlH [Q2(el,IH , E[ek,I], θlH)−Q2(el,IL , E[ek,I], θlH)] . (A133)
The principal extracts all rents from any agent in the low state and the rents accruing to
the high type agent have two components:
7Complete proof available with the authors.
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(i) Rent due to extra output [Q(ek,IL , E[e
l,I], θkH)−Q(ek,IL , E[el,I], θkL)], and
(ii) Rent due to lower cost of effort [C(ek,IL , θ
k
L)− C(ek,IL , θkH)].




l,I], θkH)−Q(ek,IL , E[el,I], θkL)] + [C(ek,IL , θkL)− C(ek,IL , θkH)] . (A134)
Note here that, since Q13 ≥ 0 and C12 ≤ 0, the rents accruing to the partners are increasing in














l,O], θkL)− C1(ẽk,OH , θkH))








H)−Q2(el,OL , E[ek,O], θlL)
− φlH (Q2(el,OH , E[ek,O], θlH)−Q2(el,OL , E[ek,O], θlL)) . (A136)






L)− C(ẽk,OH , θkH)]
= [C(ek,OL , θ
k
H)− C(ẽk,OH , θkH)] + [C(ek,OL , θkL)− C(ek,OL , θkH)] . (A137)
Analogous to the earlier settings, these rents, too, can be sorted into two components: (1)
rent due to lower effort [C(ek,OL , θ
k
H)− C(ẽk,OH , θkH)], and (2) rent due to lower cost of effort
[C(ek,OL , θ
k
L)− C(ek,OL , θkH)].
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Since C1 ≥ 0, ẽk,OH < ek,OL and C12 ≤ 0, the rents under output monitoring are also
increasing in the effort exerted by the partners. Next, from (A137) and (A134) we can see
that the difference in rents under output and input monitoring (at output effort levels) is
given by
∆R = [C(ek,OL , θ
k
H)− C(ẽk,OH , θkH)]− [Q(ek,OL , E[el,O], θkH)−Q(ek,OL , E[el,O], θkL)] . (A138)
The above difference in rents arises due to the difference in rents due to lower effort (which is a
source of additional rents under output monitoring) and extra output (which is a source of ad-
ditional rents under input monitoring). Note that [φlHQ2(e
l,O
H , E[e






is the marginal impact of partner k′s effort on partner l′s output and hence denotes the
strength of the externality.
Further, notice from the first order conditions in (A135) that the marginal cost of effort
is greater than its marginal benefit when φlHQ2(e
l,O
H , E[e











l,O], θkH)− C1(ẽk,OH , θkH)). In other words, as the strength of the externality
is enhanced (i.e., the LHS of the above inequality is larger in magnitude), the difference
between the marginal cost of effort and the marginal revenue becomes larger; this essentially
induces the partners to exert higher levels of effort. Also, the rate of change of the difference


































8Recall that Q(ek,OL , E[e
l,O], θkL) = Q(ẽ
k,O
H , E[e






Since Q11 ≤ 0 and C11 ≥ 0, [C1(e, θkH)−Q1(e, E[el,O], θkH)] is increasing9 in e. Suppose for









< 1 and ẽk,OH < e
k,O











It follows that when the effort exerted by the partners increases around ek,OL , the rents under
output monitoring increase by a greater amount than the rents under input monitoring.
Therefore, it is feasible that for sufficiently high levels of effort (which arise due to a stronger
externality), the rents under output monitoring can dominate the rents under input mon-
itoring (i.e., ∆R > 0). Recall from the previous section that a sufficient condition for the
profits under input monitoring to dominate the profits under output monitoring is that the
rents under output monitoring are greater than those under input monitoring when output
monitoring optimal effort levels are induced under the two regimes. Therefore, in such a case,
input monitoring will be preferred to output monitoring. The specific functions employed in
the earlier section essentially help illustrate this idea. 
9Also note from the first order conditions in (A136) that Q1(ek,OH , E[e


























< 1. Since Q13 ≥ 0 implies
Q1(ẽk,OH , E[e
l,O], θkH) > Q1(ẽ
k,O
H , E[e





Proof of Proposition 2 (No Externality or Negative Externality)
When the partners face a negative externality from the efforts exerted by the other partners,
we can see (when δ < 0 in equations (A19)-(A20)) that the optimal effort levels under first
best are such that the partners exert less effort than what they prefer. Under input and
output monitoring, the principal continues to induce the partners in the higher state to
exert first best effort levels and the partners in the lower state to exert lower effort than
under the first best conditions. This can be seen by setting δ < 0 in equations (A54)-(A55)
and (A105)-(A106). Defining,
















∆̂B = eB,IL (θ
B














We note that the difference in the principal’s profits under output and input monitoring
(at optimal effort levels under input monitoring) are given11 by







































11Using the transfer payments under (A58)-(A59) and (A109)-(A110)
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Recalling, (A19), notice that the effort exerted by the low state partner under first best
levels is 12 θAL(θ
A








L + δ) ∀ δ ≤ 0, inequality (A146) always13 holds.
Hence, output monitoring is always more profitable than input monitoring when δ ≤ 0 and
the statement in Proposition 2 follows. 
Comparing Effort Levels
Here, we derive the necessary condition for optimal effort levels under input monitoring to
dominate those under output monitoring (see the discussion in section (2.4.5) in the main
text) . The optimal effort levels exerted by the partners in the low state under input and





















12Note that δ < 0.
13Note that the partner in the lower state is always induced to exert lower effort compared to the first
best level.
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Comparing the effort levels, we see that the effort under input monitoring is greater when




















⇒ δ > δ̃ = (θ
k
H)







Hence, when δ > δ̃, the effort exerted by the agents in the low state is higher under input
monitoring.
Alternatively, recall that the rents under input monitoring that arise due to extra output




H − ek,IL θkL] and the rents under output monitoring that arise due


































> 0—i.e., the rents are increasing in the effort exerted by the














− (θkH − θkL). (A150)
Now, from the first order conditions (Eq. 2.9) and (Eq. 2.18), it is easy to show that
ek,IL > e
k,O






























> 0⇒ δ > δ̃ is a sufficient condition for ek,IL > ek,OL . Hence,
it is sufficient for the marginal-rents- due-to-lower-effort to dominate the marginal-rents-due-
to-extra-output for input monitoring to induce greater effort levels.
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Comparing δ̃ and δ∗, we have
δ∗ − δ̃ =2 [(θ
k
H)



























APPENDIX B: PROOFS FOR RESULTS IN CHAPTER 3
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Proof of Lemma 1 (First Best Setting)
The manufacturer’s profits are given by
Π = Q1(p1 − c) +Q2(p2 − c)−G1 −G2. (B1)
The manufacturer’s optimization problem (denoted by [M-FB]) can be expressed as
Max Π = Q1(p1 − c) +Q2(p2 − c)−G1 −G2
{p1, p2, e1, e2}
(B2)













































































































Hence, we can see from (B3)-(B6) that for symmetric retailers, p1 = p2 and e1 = e2 and the






(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1





















∗) satisfy equations (B12)-(B13) and the statement of the Lemma 1 follows. 
Proof of Lemma 2(Second Best Setting)
Here, the retailers decide price and advertising. The retailer’s profit functions are given by
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π1 = Q1(p1 − w)−G1 − F, (B15)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)−G2 − F. (B16)
The retailers choose pi and ei (i ∈ {1, 2}) to maximize profits. The manufacturer’s profit
function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F. (B17)









= 0 and ∂π
2
∂e2
= 0 (the retailer’s surplus is extracted and the first order condition of the
retailer are satisfied) The manufacturer’s optimization problem can be expressed as
Max Π
{w,w, F, F, p1, p2, e1, e2}
(B18)













The Lagrangian for the manufacturer’s optimization problem can be expressed as
L =Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F+
λ1
[




















































The first order conditions are given by
∂L
∂w


















=1− λ1 = 0, (B22)
∂L
∂F






(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1


































(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p2


































(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1




































(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e2


































= Q1(p1 − w)−G1 − F = 0, (B28)
∂L
∂λ2













































From (B22) and (B23) we can see that λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 1. Substituting in equations
























(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1





















(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p2













































































< 0 and ∂Q
1
∂e1
> 0). Similarly, from (B35) , we can see that µ2 and η2
must either both be zero, both positive or both negative (since ∂Q
2
∂p2





































The above equations can be expressed as
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c), (B44)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c), (B45)
∂Q1
∂e1









(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p2 − c), (B46)
∂Q2
∂e2









(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂e2
(p1 − c). (B47)




(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p1 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p1 − c), (B48)
∂Q1
∂e1









(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p1 − c). (B49)
Recall that the price and effort under first best (with symmetric retailers) are governed






(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1













Notice from (B48) and (B49) that the manufacturer controls the price charged and the






> 0 and ∂Q
2
∂e1
> 0. Comparing (B48)-(B49) and (B50)-(B51) that the first best solution
can be achieved if the manufacturer sets w such that ∂Q
1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q2
∂p1
(p1 − c) = 0 and
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q2
∂e1























































< 0, the above equation can never be satisfied14. Hence, the first best cannot be
achieved.
In order to understand the impact of w on the price and effort choice under second best,
we can express (B48) - (B49) as
∂π1
∂p1






w +Q1 = 0, (B57)
∂π1
∂e1














= 0 and ∂Q
2
∂e1
= 0 or ∂Q
1
∂e1
= 0 and ∂Q
2
∂e1
= 0 — i.e., both the cross price and cross effort (free
riding) effects are nonexistent or the effort does not affect demand. One other scenario where the equation












































)2 > 0. (B61)





















































































































































































< 0, inequality (B70) is always satisfied when ∂
2Q1
∂p21
≤ 0. The corresponding











































































































































is always satisfied and hence ∂e1
∂w
< 0. Assuming ∂e1
∂w
< 0 and ∂p1
∂w
> 0, let us compare the
levels of price and effort under second best with those under first best. First denote p̂ and
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ê as the price and effort under the second best solution. Next, denote p∗ and e∗ as the
price and effort under the first best solution. The manufacturer sets retail prices and efforts
under first best such that the difference between marginal revenue and marginal cost is zero.
Hence, denoting the difference between marginal revenue and marginal cost as DMRMCfbi




(p∗1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1















(p̂1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p̂1 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1













(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p̂1 − c) (B83)
Comparing the price and effort levels under first best with those under second best, we
can have the following potential cases
(i) p̂ > p∗ and ê > e∗
(ii) p̂ > p∗ and ê < e∗
(iii) p̂ < p∗ and ê > e∗
(iv) p̂ < p∗ and ê < e∗
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p = 0 and (B84)
DMRMCsbe < DMRMC
fb
e = 0 (B85)
Hence, we must have the following conditions being satisfied simultaneously
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p̂1 − c) < 0 and (B86)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1




> 0 and ∂Q
2
∂e1
> 0, for equation (B87) to be satisfied, we must have w < c. Since,
∂Q1
∂p1
< 0 and ∂Q
2
∂p1
> 0, for equation (B86) to be satisfied when w < c, we must also have
p̂1 < c. Since p
∗ > c, p̂1 > p
∗
1 will be violated when p̂1 < c. Hence, p̂ > p
∗ and ê > e∗ is not
possible (also note that when w < c and p̂1 < c, we will have Π < 0).
Next, when p̂ > p∗ and ê < e∗, we must have
DMRMCsbp < DMRMC
fb
p = 0 and (B88)
DMRMCsbe > DMRMC
fb
e = 0 (B89)
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Hence, we must have the following conditions being satisfied simultaneously
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p̂1 − c) < 0 and (B90)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p̂1 − c) > 0 (B91)
While we can see that the above equations can be simultaneously satisfied, we can show
that the manufacturer has an incentive to decrease the price and increase the effort exerted
by the retailer by lowering the wholesale price. Since ∂e1
∂w
< 0 and ∂p1
∂w
> 0, a reduction in
wholesale price will reduce the price and at the same time increase the effort exerted by the
retailers and thereby move the second best solution closer to the first best solution. Hence,
p̂ > p∗ and ê < e∗ cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
Next, when p̂ < p∗ and ê > e∗, we must have
DMRMCsbp > DMRMC
fb
p = 0 and (B92)
DMRMCsbe < DMRMC
fb
e = 0 (B93)
Hence, we must have the following conditions being satisfied simultaneously
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p̂1 − c) > 0 and (B94)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p̂1 − c) < 0 (B95)
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While we can see that the above equations can be simultaneously satisfied (by charging
w < c), we can show that the manufacturer has an incentive to increase the price and





> 0, an increase in wholesale price will increase the price and at the same time lower
the effort exerted by the retailers and thereby move the second best solution closer to the
first best solution. Hence, p̂ < p∗ and ê > e∗ cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
Finally, when p̂ < p∗ and ê < e∗, we must have
DMRMCsbp > DMRMC
fb
p = 0 and (B96)
DMRMCsbe > DMRMC
fb
e = 0 (B97)
Hence, we must have the following conditions being satisfied simultaneously
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p̂1 − c) > 0 and (B98)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p̂1 − c) > 0 (B99)





> 0, an increase in wholesale price will increase the price and at the same time
lower the effort exerted by the retailers. Hence, an increase in the wholesale price moves
the second best price closer to the first best price and the second best effort farther from
the first best effort. Therefore, increasing the wholesale price will not necessarily move the
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second best solution any closer to the first best solution. Similarly, a decrease in wholesale
price will decrease the price and at the same time increase the effort exerted by the retailers.
The lowering of wholesale price moves the second best price farther from the first best price
and the second best effort closer to the first best effort. Hence, decreasing the wholesale
price will not necessarily move the second best solution any closer to the first best solution.
Therefore, p̂ < p∗ and ê < e∗ is the only viable equilibrium outcome and the statement of
the Lemma 2 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Here, the retailers decide price and advertising and the manufacturer reimburses part (frac-
tion α) of the retailer’s advertising costs (the manufacturer does not set any upper bound
on the reimbursement). The retailer’s profit functions are given by
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− (1− α)G1 − F (B100)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− (1− α)G2 − F (B101)
The manufacturer’s profit function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F − αG1 − αG2 (B102)










= 0 and ∂π
2
∂e2
= 0 (the retailer’s surplus is extracted and the first order condition of the
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retailer are satisfied) The manufacturer’s optimization problem can be expressed as
Max Π
{w,w, F, F, p1, p2, e1, e2, α}
(B103)













The Lagrangian for the manufacturer’s optimization problem can be expressed as
L =Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F − αG1 − αG2+
λ1
[









































































=1− λ1 = 0 (B107)
∂L
∂F






(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1


































(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p2


































(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1








































(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e2















































=Q1(p1 − w)− (1− α)G1 − F = 0 (B114)
∂L
∂λ2













































From (B107) and (B108) we can see that λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 1. Substituting in equations
























(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1





















(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p2
























































































< 0). Similarly, from (B121) , we can see that µ2 and η2 must either
both be zero, both positive or both negative (since ∂Q
2
∂p2
< 0) But, from (B126) we can see
that η1 and η2 cannot have the same sign. Using (B120)-(B121), the first order conditions






(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1























(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p2


























































































=Q1(p1 − w)− (1− α)G1 − F = 0 (B131)
∂L
∂λ2



















































































w = 0 (B140)
∂L
∂µ2







w = 0 (B141)
∂L
∂η1























Re-arranging the above equations, we have
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (B144)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (B145)
∂Q1
∂e1








































When the retailers are symmetric, we can see from the above equations that p1 = p2 and
e1 = e2 must be the solution and hence the above equations reduce to the following
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p1 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p1 − c) (B148)
∂Q1
∂e1



















The above equations can be expressed as







w = 0 (B150)










Note that the second order conditions for the retailer’s optimization problem (for sym-









































)2 > 0 (B154)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































)2 > 0, ∂Q
1
∂e1




we must have ∂p1
∂α
> 0.


















































































)2 > 0, ∂f
∂p1
< 0 and since
∂G1
∂e1









> 0 and ∂e1
∂α
> 0, let us compare the levels of price and
effort under second best with those under first best. First denote pα and eα as the price and
effort under the coop rate solution. Next, denote p∗ and e∗ as the price and effort under
the first best solution. The manufacturer sets retail prices and efforts under first best such
that the difference between marginal revenue and marginal cost is zero. Hence, denoting
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the difference between marginal revenue and marginal cost as DMRMCfbi ∀i ∈ {p, e}, for




(p∗1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1















(pα1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(pα1 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1













(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1




Comparing the price and effort levels under first best with those under the coop rate
plan, we can have the following potential cases
(i) pα > p∗ and eα > e∗
(ii) pα > p∗ and eα < e∗
(iii) pα < p∗ and eα > e∗
(iv) pα < p∗ and eα < e∗
(v) pα = p∗ and eα = e∗





p = 0 and (B190)
DMRMCαe < DMRMC
fb
e = 0 (B191)
Hence, we must have the following conditions being satisfied simultaneously
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(pα1 − c) < 0 and (B192)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1











> 0 and ∂e1
∂α
> 0, the manufacturer can lower the wholesale price and the coop
rate α to move pα and eα closer to the first best levels. Hence, pα > p∗ and eα > e∗ cannot
be an equilibrium outcome.
Next, when pα > p∗ and eα < e∗, we must have
DMRMCαp < DMRMC
fb
p = 0 and (B194)
DMRMCαe > DMRMC
fb
e = 0 (B195)
Hence, we must have the following conditions being satisfied simultaneously
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(pα1 − c) < 0 and (B196)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1





While we can see that the above equations can be simultaneously satisfied, we can show
that the manufacturer has an incentive to decrease the price and increase the effort exerted
by the retailer by lowering the wholesale price. Since ∂e1
∂w
< 0 and ∂p1
∂w
> 0, a reduction in
wholesale price will reduce the price and at the same time increase the effort exerted by the
retailers and thereby move the solution closer to the first best solution. Hence, pα > p∗ and
eα < e∗ cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
Next, when pα < p∗ and eα > e∗, we must have
DMRMCαp > DMRMC
fb
p = 0 and (B198)
DMRMCαe < DMRMC
fb
e = 0 (B199)
Hence, we must have the following conditions being satisfied simultaneously
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(pα1 − c) > 0 and (B200)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1




While we can see that the above equations can be simultaneously satisfied, we can show
that the manufacturer has an incentive to increase the price and decrease the effort exerted
by the retailer by increasing the wholesale price. Since ∂e1
∂w
< 0 and ∂p1
∂w
> 0, an increase in
wholesale price will increase the price and at the same time lower the effort exerted by the
retailers and thereby move the solution closer to the first best solution. Hence, pα < p∗ and
eα > e∗ cannot be an equilibrium outcome.




p = 0 and (B202)
DMRMCαe > DMRMC
fb
e = 0 (B203)
Hence, we must have the following conditions being satisfied simultaneously
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(pα1 − c) > 0 and (B204)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1











> 0 and ∂e1
∂α
> 0, the manufacturer can increase the coop rate α to increase both
the price and effort levels. Hence, pα < p∗ and eα < e∗ cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
Hence, pα = p∗ and eα = e∗ is the equilibrium outcome. We compute below the wholesale
price (w) and the coop rate α required to achieve the first best.




(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (B206)
∂Q1
∂p1
(p2 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q1
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p1 − c) (B207)
∂Q1
∂e1













































(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p1 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p1 − c) (B210)
∂Q1
∂e1



















If the manufacturer sets w and α such that
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p1 − c) = 0, (B212)(
∂Q1
∂e1









equations (B210) and (B211) simplify to
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p1 − c) +Q1 = 0 (B214)
∂Q1
∂e1







This is identical to the first order conditions for the first best setting (with symmetrical
retailers). The manufacturer’s profits are given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F − αG1 − αG2 (B216)







The fixed fees are obtained by solving equations (B114) and (B115) and are given by
F = Q1(p1 − w)− (1− α)G1 (B217)
F = Q2(p2 − w)− (1− α)G2 (B218)
Substituting in the manufacturer’s profit function, we have
Π =Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F − αG1 − αG2 (B219)
=Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) +Q1(p1 − w)− (1− α)G1 +Q2(p2 − w)− (1− α)G2 − αG1 − αG2
(B220)
=Q1(p1 − c) +Q2(p2 − c)−G1 −G2 (B221)
This is identical to the first best. We now show that (B212) and (B213) can be solved.
Solving for (w − c) from (B212), we have








































Note that when (B213) is satisfied, we can see from (B211) that ∂Q
1
∂e1































































Substituting for α from (B226) and for (p1−c)
∂G1
∂e1









































































































< 0 which is always true (B233)



















and the statement of
proposition 1 follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2
When the manufacturer offers the retailers a cooperative advertising contract that includes a
participation rate α and an accrual rate δ, a fraction of the retailer’s advertising costs(αGi)
are reimbursed and the total cost reimbursement is caped at a fraction of the wholesale
receipts(δ). Hence, the advertising cost reimbursement is given by
(i) αGi if αGi ≤ δwQi
(ii) δwQi if αGi > δwQi
Given this cooperative advertising contract, the retailers have two options:
(i) expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement is less than or equal to the total
accrual(αGi ≤ δwQi)
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(ii) expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement is greater than the total accrual(αGi >
δwQi)
We consider each scenario separately
Effort Levels are Chosen Such That the Total Cost Reimbursement is Less
than or Equal to the Total Accrual
When the retailers choose effort such that αGi ≤ δwQi, the retailers are reimbursed αGi.
Hence, the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− F −G1 + αG1 (B234)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− F −G2 + αG2 (B235)
The manufacturer’s profit function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F − αG1 − αG2 (B236)




subject to δwQ1 − αG1 ≥ 0
The Lagrangian for the retailer’s optimization problem is given by





16Note that since the retailers are symmetric, the solution to retailer 2’s optimization problem is identical
to retailer 1’s problem.
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(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1





















=δwQ1 − αG1 ≥ 0 (B241)
θ1(δwQ
1 − αG1) = 0 (B242)
θ1 ≥ 0 (B243)
With respect to the Lagrange multiplier, we have two possibilities
• θ1 = 0
• θ1 > 0
In the next few section, we consider each of the above cases separately.
θ1 = 0
If the Lagrange multiplier θ1 = 0, then we must have δwQ
1 − αG1 ≥ 0. The first order


















=δwQ1 − αG1 ≥ 0 (B246)
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Notice that these first order conditions are identical to the case where the manufacturer
offers a cooperative advertising contract that only comprises of a single participation rate
α. As we have shown earlier, the first best solution cannot be achieved in this case. The
accrual rate δ can be set high enough to satisfy (B246).
θ1 > 0
If θ1 > 0, then we must have δwQ
1 − αG1 = 0. The first order conditions that govern the






(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1





















=δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (B249)
From (B247), we can see that





Substituting the above in (B248), and solving for θ1, we have
∂Q1
∂e1


























(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1
) = 0 (B253)
∂LR1
∂θ1
=δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (B254)
Re-arranging the retailers’ first order conditions, we have
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1




δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (B256)
In order for the manufacturer to induce the first best solution, the manufacturer must choose
w, α and δ such that
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c)− θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1
) = 0 (B257)
δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (B258)










With regards to the retail effort, we can see from equations (B258) that the manufacturer
can induce the retailer to expend first best effort by choosing the participation rate α and
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is the cost of effort incurred when exerting first best effort levels and Q1
∗
is the
demand when first best price and effort levels are exerted by both retailers. Also, we can























Hence, the first best can be achieved if the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices,


























Hence, the first best solution can be achieved only when the above conditions are satisfied.
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Effort Levels are Chosen Such That the Total Cost Reimbursement is
Greater than the Total Accrual
When the retailers choose effort such that αGi > δwQi, the retailers are reimbursed δwQi.
Hence, the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− F −G1 + δwQ1 (B266)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− F −G2 + δwQ2 (B267)
The manufacturer’s profit function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F − δwQ1 − δwQ2 (B268)




























(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1


















(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1





As we can see from the above equations, in order for the first best to be achieved, the
following equations must be satisfied simultaneously.
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1






(w(1− δ)− c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) = 0 (B273)
∂Q1
∂e1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1






(w(1− δ)− c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1




> 0 and ∂Q
2
∂e1
> 0, we can see that equations (B274) cannot be satisfied for
any choice of w and δ. Hence, the first best cannot be achieved when the retailers choose to
expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement through the participation rate is greater
than the total accrual. Hence, the first best can be achieved only when the retailers expend
effort such that the total cost reimbursement through the participation rate is less than or
equal to the total accrual. In this scenario, the manufacturer can achieve the first best in two
way: 1) choosing w, α and δ such that equations ()-() are satisfied or 2) choosing w, α and
A such that equations ()-() are satisfied. In case 1, the accrual rate does not impact retail
behavior and in case 2, the participation rate and the accrual rate both impact the retailer’s
behavior. Also, since the manufacturer uses a two-part tariff, the retail profits under all
scenarios are equal to their reservation profit levels and hence the retailers would prefer the
equilibrium that results in first best profits to the manufacturer. We now investigate the
impact of the variable accrual rate on the retailer’s price and effort choices by computing
the comparative statics of price and effort with respect to the accrual rate.
Understanding The Impact of The Accrual Rate Linked to Wholesale Receipts
The first order conditions for the retailer R1 under the fixed accrual rate contract (derived







(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1





















= F3 =δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (B277)



































































































































(p1 − (1− θ1δ)w) < 0 (B288)














































































































































































































































Hence, when ∆1 < 0, we must have ∂p1
∂δ
< 0. We now consider the comparative static with



















































































































































































Hence, when ∆2 < 0, we must have ∂p1
∂α






0, ∆2 < 0 is always satisfied. We now consider the comparative static with respect to the

















































































































































































(p1 − (1− θ1δ)w)− [1− α(1− θ1)]
∂2G1
∂e21












Hence, when ∆3 > 0, we must have ∂p1
∂w






0, ∆3 > 0 is always satisfied. We now consider the comparative statics for the effort. Using

































































































































































































Hence, when ∆4 < 0, we must have ∂e1
∂δ





< 0, we must
have ∆4 > 0 and hence ∂e1
∂δ
> 0. We now consider the comparative static with respect to the


















































































































































































Hence, when ∆5 < 0, we must have ∂e1
∂α
< 0. We now consider the comparative static with



































































































































































































Hence, when ∆6 > 0, we must have ∂e1
∂w









< 0 ensures ∆3 > 0),
• ∂e1
∂w
> 0 when ∆6 > 0,
• ∂p1
∂α





< 0 ensures ∆2 < 0),
• ∂e1
∂α
< 0 when ∆5 < 0,
• ∂p1
∂δ
< 0 when ∆1 < 0,
• ∂e1
∂δ





< 0 ensures ∆4 > 0).
Proof of Proposition 3
When the manufacturer offers the retailers a cooperative advertising contract that includes
a participation rate α and an fixed accrual rate A, a fraction of the retailer’s advertising
costs(αGi) are reimbursed and the total cost reimbursement is capped at A. Hence, the
advertising cost reimbursement is given by
(i) αGi if αGi ≤ A
(ii) A if αGi > A
173
Given this cooperative advertising contract, the retailers have two options:
(i) expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement is less than or equal to the total
accrual(αGi ≤ A)
(ii) expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement is greater than the total accrual(αGi >
A)
We consider each scenario separately
Effort Levels are Chosen Such That the Total Cost Reimbursement is Less
than or Equal to the Total Accrual
When the retailers choose effort such that αGi ≤ A, the retailers are reimbursed αGi. Hence,
the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− F −G1 + αG1 (B309)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− F −G2 + αG2 (B310)
The manufacturer’s profit function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F + F − αG1 − αG2 (B311)




subject to A− αG1 ≥ 0
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The Lagrangian for the retailer’s optimization problem is given by





























=A− αG1 ≥ 0 (B316)
θ1(A− αG1) = 0 (B317)
θ1 ≥ 0 (B318)
With respect to the Lagrange multiplier, we have two possibilities
• θ1 = 0
• θ1 > 0
In the next few sections, we consider each of the above cases separately.
θ1 = 0
If the Lagrange multiplier θ1 = 0, then we must have A−αG1 ≥ 0. The first order conditions



















=A− αG1 ≥ 0 (B321)
Notice that these first order conditions are identical to the case where the manufacturer
offers a cooperative advertising contract that only comprises of a single participation rate
α. As we have shown earlier, the first best solution can be achieved in this case. The fixed
accrual rate A can be set high enough to satisfy (B321).
θ1 > 0
If θ1 > 0, then we must have A − αG1 = 0. The first order conditions that govern the
























=A− αG1 = 0 (B324)
From (B322), we can see that






Substituting the above in (B323), and solving for θ1, we have
∂Q1
∂e1























(p1 − w) +Q1 = 0 (B328)
A− αG1 = 0 (B329)
Re-arranging the retailers’ first order conditions, we have
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (B330)
A− αG1 = 0 (B331)
In order for the manufacturer to induce the first best solution, the manufacturer must choose
w, α and A such that
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) = 0 (B332)




is the cost of effort incurred by the retailer when first best effort levels are














Notice that the Lagrange multiplier in equation (B327) depends on the participation rate
























Hence, the manufacturer can achieve the first best solution by choosing the wholesale price,






















Since the retailers are symmetric, the wholesale price, accrual rate and the participation rate
induce identical behavior from both the retailers.
Effort Levels are Chosen Such That the Total Cost Reimbursement is
Greater than the Total Accrual
When the retailers choose effort such that αGi > A, the retailers are reimbursed A. Hence,
the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− F −G1 + A (B341)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− F −G2 + A (B342)

















Notice that the above first order conditions are identical to the second best setting. Hence,
the manufacturer cannot induce the first best price and effort levels in this case. In summary,
the manufacturer can induce the first best solution only when the retailers exert effort such
that the total cost reimbursement is less than or equal to the total accrual. In this scenario,
the manufacturer can achieve the first best in two way: 1) choosing w, α and A such that
equations (B319)-(B321) are satisfied or 2) choosing w, α and A such that equations (B338)-
(B340) are satisfied. In case 1, the accrual rate does not impact retail behavior and in case
2, the participation rate and the accrual rate both impact the retailer’s behavior. Also,
since the manufacturer uses a two-part tariff, the retail profits under all scenarios are equal
to their reservation profit levels and hence the retailers would prefer the equilibrium that
results in first best profits to the manufacturer. We now investigate the impact of the fixed
accrual rate on the retailer’s price and effort choices by computing the comparative statics
of price and effort with respect to the accrual rate.
Understanding the Impact of The Fixed Accrual Rate
The first order conditions for the retailer R1 under the fixed accrual rate contract (derived
























= f3 =A− αG1 = 0 (B347)
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. The second order conditions for the retailer’s optimization























































































































(p1 − w) < 0 (B358)





(p1 − w)− [1− α(1− θ1)] ∂
2G1
∂e21
























 < 0 (B360)
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(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21



























(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21












Notice that the denominator for (B361) is identical to the second order condition and must
be negative. Hence, we must have ∂p1
∂A
> 0. We now consider the comparative static with
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(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21




























(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21












Notice that the denominator for (B362) is identical to the second order condition and must
be negative. Hence, we must have ∂p1
∂α
< 0. We now consider the comparative static with
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(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21




























(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21













Notice that the denominator for (B363) is identical to the second order condition and must
be negative. Since ∂Q
1
∂p1
< 0, we must have ∂p1
∂w
> 0. We now consider the comparative statics
for the effort.
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(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21


































(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21



















(p1 − w) are both negative. Hence, we must have ∂e1∂A > 0. We now consider the
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(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21




































(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21




















(p1 − w) are both negative. Hence, we must have ∂e1∂α < 0. We now consider the

















































































(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21























(p1 − w) 0
∂2Q1
∂e21

































As we can see from the above comparative statics, as the manufacturer increases the accrual
rate, the retailers increase both their price and effort levels. The impact of the participation
rate is negative on both the price and effort. Since the retailers choose effort such that the
total cost reimbursement is equal to the accrual rate, an increase in the participation rate
would require a lower effort to ensure that the total reimbursement is equal to the accrual
rate. Hence, the retailers reduce their effort levels. This lowering of effort causes an indirect
lowering of the retail prices as well. Since the retailer’s choice of effort is governed solely by
the criterion to equate cost reimbursement to constant accrual rate, the wholesale price does
not impact retail efforts. The retail price is affected negatively by the wholesale price due
to its impact on the retailer’s margin. 
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APPENDIX C: PROOFS FOR RESULTS IN CHAPTER 4
191
Proof of Lemma 1
From the earlier proofs in Appendix B, we know that the first order conditions under the






(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1






(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p2


























Proof of Lemma 2


































The above equations can be expressed as




(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (C9)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (C10)
∂Q1
∂e1









(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p2 − c) (C11)
∂Q2
∂e2









(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂e2




> 0 and ∂Q
2
∂e2
> 0, the manufacturer cannot choose the wholesale prices such that
∂Q1
∂e1
(w− c) + ∂Q2
∂e1
(p2− c) = 0 and ∂Q
2
∂e2
(w− c) + ∂Q1
∂e2
(p1− c) = 0. Hence, the first best cannot
be achieved. 
Proof of Proposition 1
In this setting, the equations that govern the retailer’s price and effort choices are given by
∂L
∂µ1








w = 0 (C13)
∂L
∂µ2








w = 0 (C14)
∂L
∂η1










































































































)2 > 0 (C22)


























Re-arranging the equations (C13)-(C16), we have
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (C27)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (C28)
∂Q1
∂e1








































The manufacturer can ensure that the retailers expend first best effort levels and charge




(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1









(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2


















































































Since the manufacturer offers a single participation rate α, in order to induce first best































Notice that the condition (C35) holds when the retailers are symmetric. When the retailers
are asymmetric, and when condition (C35) does not hold, the manufacturer cannot induce
the first best effort levels from both retailers simultaneously. Also, since the manufacturer
charges a single wholesale price we can see from equations (C31)-(C32) that in order to



























When the retailers are perfectly symmetric, the above equation is satisfied. However, when
the retailers are asymmetric, and equation (C37) is not satisfied, the manufacturer cannot
induce the first best price levels from both retailers simultaneously. 
Proof of Proposition 2
When the manufacturer offers the retailers a cooperative advertising contract that includes a
participation rate α and an accrual rate δ, a fraction of the retailer’s advertising costs(αGi)
are reimbursed and the total cost reimbursement is caped at a fraction of the wholesale
receipts(δ). Hence, the advertising cost reimbursement is given by
196
(i) αGi if αGi ≤ δwQi
(ii) δwQi if αGi > δwQi
Given this cooperative advertising contract, the retailers have two options:
(i) expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement is less than or equal to the total
accrual(αGi ≤ δwQi)
(ii) expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement is greater than the total accrual(αGi >
δwQi)
We consider each scenario separately
Effort Levels are Chosen Such That the Total Cost Reimbursement is Less
than or Equal to the Total Accrual
When the retailers choose effort such that αGi ≤ δwQi, the retailers are reimbursed αGi.
Hence, the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− F 1 −G1 + αG1 (C38)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− F 2 −G2 + αG2 (C39)
The manufacturer’s profit function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − αG1 − αG2 (C40)
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subject to δwQ1 − αG1 ≥ 0
The Lagrangian for the retailer’s optimization problem is given by











(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1





















=δwQ1 − αG1 ≥ 0 (C45)
θ1(δwQ
1 − αG1) = 0 (C46)
θ1 ≥ 0 (C47)
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The first order conditions for retailer 2’s optimization problem are similar to that of






(p2 − w) +Q2 + θ2(δw
∂Q2
∂p2


















=δwQ2 − αG2 ≥ 0 (C50)
θ2(δwQ
2 − αG2) = 0 (C51)
θ2 ≥ 0 (C52)
With respect to the Lagrange multipliers, we have four possibilities
• θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 0
• θ1 > 0 and θ2 > 0
• θ1 > 0 and θ2 = 0
• θ1 = 0 and θ2 > 0
In the next few sections, we consider each of the above cases separately.
θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 0
If the Lagrange multiplier θi = 0, then we must have δwQ
i − αGi ≥ 0. The first order






































=δwQ2 − αG2 ≥ 0 (C58)
(C59)
Notice that these first order conditions are identical to the case where the manufacturer
offers a cooperative advertising contract that only comprises of a single participation rate
α. As we have shown earlier, the first best solution cannot be achieved in this case. The
accrual rate δ can be set high enough to simultaneously satisfy (C50) and (C58).
θ1 > 0 and θ2 > 0
If θi > 0, then we must have δwQ
i − αGi = 0. The first order conditions that govern the







(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1





























(p2 − w) +Q2 + θ2(δw
∂Q2
∂p2


















=δwQ2 − αG2 = 0 (C66)
(C67)
From (C60), we can see that





Substituting the above in (C61), and solving for θ1, we have
∂Q1
∂e1















































































From (C72) and (C75), we can see that the manufacturer’s choice of participation rate must
satisfy



























(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1
) = 0 (C77)
∂LR1
∂θ1






(p2 − w) +Q2 + θ2(δw
∂Q2
∂p2
) = 0 (C79)
∂LR2
∂θ2
=δwQ2 − αG2 = 0 (C80)
(C81)
Re-arranging the retailers’ first order conditions, we have
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1






(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2




δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (C84)
δwQ2 − αG2 = 0 (C85)
In order for the manufacturer to induce the first best solution, the manufacturer must choose




(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c)− θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1
) = 0 (C86)
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c)− θ2(δw
∂Q2
∂p2
) = 0 (C87)
δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (C88)
δwQ2 − αG2 = 0 (C89)



















Hence, in order for the manufacturer to simultaneously induce both retailers to charge first

















With regards to the retail effort, we can see from equations (C88) and (C89) that the
manufacturer can induce the retailers to expend first best efforts by choosing the participation
204





























is the cost of effort incurred when exerting first best effort levels and Qi
∗
is the
demand when first best price and effort levels are exerted by both retailers. Hence, the first
best can be achieved if the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices, accrual rate and the














































θ1 > 0 and θ2 = 0






(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1







































=δwQ2 − αG2 ≥ 0 (C105)








, retailer 1’s price and effort choices are governed by (C100)
and (C102) respectively. Retailer 2’s price and effort are governed by (C103) and (C104)
respectively. Also note that retailer 2 also ensures that (C105) is satisfied. Hence, the first




(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1
) = 0 (C106)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − w) +Q2 = 0 (C107)
δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (C108)
∂Q2
∂e2
















δwQ2 − αG2 ≥ 0 (C111)
The first order conditions noted above can be expressed as
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1






(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (C113)
δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (C114)
∂Q2
∂e2









(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂e2
























(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1






(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p2

























Comparing (C118) and (C112), we can see that the manufacturer can induce R1 to charge
first best price by setting the wholesale price such that
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c)− θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1










Similarly, comparing (C119) and (C113), we can see that the manufacturer can induce
R2 to charge first best price by setting the wholesale price such that
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) = 0 (C124)























Comparing (C121) and (C115), we can see that the manufacturer can induce R2 to exert
first best effort levels by choosing the participation rate α such that
∂Q2
∂e2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂e2

































































Next, the manufacturer can induce R1 to exert first best effort levels by offering an accrual
rate δ such that
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δwQ1
∗ − αG1∗ = 0 (C132)




where w is as given by (C123), Q1
∗
is the demand when first best price and effort are charged
by both retailers, G1
∗
is the cost of effort incurred to expend first best levels of cost and α
is the participation rate (given by (C128)) that induces R2 to exert first best effort. Also,
in order for the first best solution to be achieved, the participation rate α, the wholesale
price w, the accrual rate δ and the first best price and effort levels must satisfy the following
inequality
δwQ1





∗ − αG2∗ ≥ 0 (C135)
⇒ G1∗Q1∗ −G2∗Q1∗ ≥ 0 (C136)
In summary, the manufacturer can induce both the retailers to charge first best prices and









































∗ −G2∗Q1∗ ≥ 0 (C139)
210
The solution to the case where θ1 = 0 and θ2 > 0 is symmetric to the solution described
above.
Effort Levels are Chosen Such That the Total Cost Reimbursement is
Greater than the Total Accrual
When the retailers choose effort such that αGi > δwQi, the retailers are reimbursed δwQi.
Hence, the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− F 1 −G1 + δwQ1 (C140)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− F 2 −G2 + δwQ2 (C141)
The manufacturer’s profit function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − δwQ1 − δwQ2 (C142)























The first order conditions for retailer 2’s optimization problem are similar to that of























The above first order conditions can be expressed as
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w(1− δ)− c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (C148)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w(1− δ)− c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (C149)
∂Q1
∂e1









(w(1− δ)− c) + ∂Q
2
∂e1
(p2 − c) (C150)
∂Q2
∂e2









(w(1− δ)− c) + ∂Q
1
∂e2










> 0 and ∂Q
2
∂e1
> 0, from (C150) and (C151), we can see that the
manufacturer cannot induce the retailers to exert first best effort levels for any choice of δ
and w. 
Proof of Proposition 3
When the manufacturer offers the retailers a cooperative advertising contract that includes
a participation rate α and an fixed accrual rate A, a fraction of the retailer’s advertising
costs(αGi) are reimbursed and the total cost reimbursement is capped at A. Hence, the
advertising cost reimbursement is given by
212
(i) αGi if αGi ≤ A
(ii) A if αGi > A
Given this cooperative advertising contract, the retailers have two options:
(i) expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement is less than or equal to the total
accrual(αGi ≤ A)
(ii) expend effort such that the total cost reimbursement is greater than the total accrual(αGi >
A)
We consider each scenario separately
Effort Levels are Chosen Such That the Total Cost Reimbursement is Less
than or Equal to the Total Accrual
When the retailers choose effort such that αGi ≤ A, the retailers are reimbursed αGi. Hence,
the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− F 1 −G1 + αG1 (C152)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− F 2 −G2 + αG2 (C153)
The manufacturer’s profit function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − αG1 − αG2 (C154)
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subject to A− αG1 ≥ 0
The Lagrangian for the retailer’s optimization problem is given by





























=A− αG1 ≥ 0 (C159)
θ1(A− αG1) = 0 (C160)
θ1 ≥ 0 (C161)
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The first order conditions for retailer 2’s optimization problem are similar to that of
























=A− αG2 ≥ 0 (C164)
θ2(A− αG2) = 0 (C165)
θ2 ≥ 0 (C166)
With respect to the Lagrange multipliers, we have four possibilities
• θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 0
• θ1 > 0 and θ2 > 0
• θ1 > 0 and θ2 = 0
• θ1 = 0 and θ2 > 0
In the next few sections, we consider each of the above cases separately.
θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 0
If the Lagrange multiplier θi = 0, then we must have A−αGi ≥ 0. The first order conditions






































=A− αG2 ≥ 0 (C172)
Notice that these first order conditions are identical to the case where the manufacturer
offers a cooperative advertising contract that only comprises of a single participation rate α.
As we have shown earlier, the first best solution cannot be achieved in this case. The fixed
accrual rate A can be set high enough to simultaneously satisfy (C169) and (C172).
θ1 > 0 and θ2 > 0
If θi > 0, then we must have A − αGi = 0. The first order conditions that govern the


















































=A− αG2 = 0 (C178)
From (C173), we can see that





Substituting the above in (C174), and solving for θ1, we have
∂Q1
∂e1





































(p1 − w) +Q1 = 0 (C183)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − w) +Q2 = 0 (C184)
A− αG1 = 0 (C185)
A− αG2 = 0 (C186)
Re-arranging the retailers’ first order conditions, we have
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (C187)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (C188)
A− αG1 = 0 (C189)
A− αG2 = 0 (C190)
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In order for the manufacturer to induce the first best solution, the manufacturer must choose
w, w, α and A such that
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) = 0 (C191)
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) = 0 (C192)
A− αG1∗ = 0 (C193)
A− αG2∗ = 0 (C194)
where Gi
∗
is the cost of effort incurred by retailer i when first best effort levels are expended.



















































⇒ G1∗ = G2∗ (C200)







































































































θ1 > 0 and θ2 = 0










































=A− αG2 ≥ 0 (C212)








, retailer 1’s price and effort choices are governed by (C207)
and (C209) respectively. Retailer 2’s price and effort are governed by (C210) and (C211)
respectively. Also note that retailer 2 also ensures that (C212) is satisfied. Hence, the first




(p1 − w) +Q1 = 0 (C213)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − w) +Q2 = 0 (C214)
A− αG1 = 0 (C215)
∂Q2
∂e2
















A− αG2 ≥ 0 (C218)
The first order conditions noted above can be expressed as
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (C219)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (C220)
A− αG1 = 0 (C221)
∂Q2
∂e2









(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂e2
























(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1






(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p2

























Comparing (C225) and (C219), we can see that the manufacturer can induce R1 to charge
first best price by setting the wholesale price such that
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) = 0 (C229)







Similarly, comparing (C226) and (C220), we can see that the manufacturer can induce R2
to charge first best price by setting the wholesale price such that
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) = 0 (C231)



































Comparing (C228) and (C222), we can see that the manufacturer can induce R2 to exert
first best effort levels by choosing the participation rate α such that
∂Q2
∂e2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂e2



































































Next, the manufacturer can induce R1 to exert first best effort levels by offering the fixed
accrual rate A such that
A− αG1∗ = 0 (C240)
⇒ A = αG1∗ (C241)
















is the cost of effort incurred to expend first best levels of cost and α is the
participation rate (given by (C236)) that induces R2 to exert first best effort. Also, in order
for the first best solution to be achieved, the participation rate α and the accrual rate A and
the first best effort levels must satisfy the following inequality
A− αG2∗ ≥ 0 (C243)
⇒ αG1∗ − αG2∗ ≥ 0 (C244)
⇒ G1∗ ≥ G2∗ (C245)
Hence, the first best solution can be achieved only when R1’s cost of effort is greater than
R2’s cost of effort under first best conditions. Hence, the manufacturer can achieve the first
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∗ ≥ G2∗ (C248)
The solution to the case where θ1 = 0 and θ2 > 0 is symmetric to the solution described
above.
Effort Levels are Chosen Such That the Total Cost Reimbursement is
Greater than the Total Accrual
When the retailers choose effort such that αGi > A, the retailers are reimbursed A. Hence,
the retailer’s profits can be expressed as
π1 = Q1(p1 − w)− F 1 −G1 + A (C249)
π2 = Q2(p2 − w)− F 2 −G2 + A (C250)
The manufacturer’s profit function is given by
Π = Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − A− A (C251)
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Notice that the first order conditions listed above are identical to the second best scenario.
Hence, the manufacturer cannot achieve the first best solution. 
Proof of Proposition 4
When the manufacturer offers a cooperative advertising contract that includes a participation
rate as well as variable accruals, the manufacturer can use the participation rate to influence
one retailer’s efforts while using the accruals to influence the other retailer’s efforts. Assuming




(p1 − w) +Q1 + θ1(δw
∂Q1
∂p1
) = 0 (C256)
∂Q1
∂e1













δwQ1 − αG1 = 0 (C258)
As derived in appendix B, the comparative statics for R1’s effort and price are given by
• ∂p1
∂w








> 0 when ∆6 > 0,
• ∂p1
∂α








< 0 when ∆5 < 0,
• ∂p1
∂δ
< 0 when ∆1 < 0,
• ∂e1
∂δ


































































































































(p2 − w) +Q2 = 0 (C262)
∂Q2
∂e2




Notice that these first order conditions are identical to the case where the cooperative ad-
vertising contract only includes a participation rate. Hence, the comparative statics of R2’s



















When the manufacturer uses a cooperative advertising contract that includes a fixed
accrual in addition to the participation rate, the manufacturer can influence one retailer’s
efforts by using the participation rate and the other retailer’s efforts using the accrual.
Assuming R1’s efforts are influenced by the accrual and R2’s efforts are influenced by the
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participation rate, the first order conditions for R1 are given by
∂Q1
∂p1
(p1 − w) +Q1 = 0 (C265)
∂Q1
∂e1










A− αG1 = 0 (C267)



















Next, R2’s first order conditions are given by
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − w) +Q2 = 0 (C269)
∂Q2
∂e2




Notice that these first order conditions are identical to the case where the cooperative ad-
vertising contract only includes a participation rate. Hence, the comparative statics of R2’s




















As we can see from the comparative statics, while the impact of the accrual on R1’s retail
price is positive when the accrual is fixed, variable accruals have a negative impact on retail
price. Also notice that the impact of the wholesale price on R1’s efforts is negative for fixed
accruals while it is positive for variable accruals. These differences form the basis of the
comparison between the two contracts.
Recall that the Lagrangian for the manufacturer’s optimization problem under the single
participation rate contact is given by
L =Q1(w − c) +Q2(w − c) + F 1 + F 2 − αG1 − αG2+
λ1
[



















































If the demand parameters are such that the marginal change in the Lagrangian with
respect to an increase in price is less than the marginal change in the Lagrangian with respect






then under the participation rate contract, the manufacturer has an incentive to induce the
retailers to exert prices greater than first best prices. Since the manufacturer benefits from
an increase in effort, retail efforts are induced to be higher. Since higher efforts lead to higher
prices, the manufacturer may lose revenues due to the increase in price. Since the benefit







), the manufacturer may induce retail prices to be greater than first best prices. Notice that
∂L
∂ei






















when the cost of effort is low or when the incentive to free ride is high or when the effect of
own advertising on demand is high, the manufacturer may prefer to induce the retailers to
exert prices that are greater than first best prices.




(p1 − c) +
∂Q2
∂p1
(p2 − c) +Q1 =
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) (C273)
∂Q2
∂p2
(p2 − c) +
∂Q1
∂p2
(p1 − c) +Q2 =
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) (C274)
∂Q1
∂e1








































we can see that the conditions that must hold simultaneously for retail prices to be greater
than first best prices and efforts to be less than first best efforts are given by
∂Q1
∂p1
(w − c) + ∂Q
2
∂p1
(p2 − c) < 0 (C277)
∂Q2
∂p2
(w − c) + ∂Q
1
∂p2
(p1 − c) < 0 (C278)(
∂Q1
∂e1


































2 . Assuming these conditions hold, we now investigate whether the
use of a participation rate and variable accrual rate contract can improve the manufacturer’s
profits by a greater amount than a contract that includes a participation rate and a fixed
accrual rate. As shown in earlier sections, we know that the fixed accrual rate A has no
impact on prices (∂p1
∂A
= 0 and ∂p2
∂A
= 0). On the other hand, as the variable participation
rate δ is increased, the retail prices of R1 decreases(when ∆1 < 0) and the price charged by
R2 is not affected. Note that the impact of the other variables ( w and the participation rate
α) are identical for the two contracts. Since the contract with variable accrual rate would
increase effort expended by one retailer as well as decrease that retailers price simultaneously,
this contract will be able to move retail prices and efforts closer to the first best solution






< 0, ∆1 < 0, ∆5 < 0 and ∆6 > 0 hold simultaneously (at
the participation rate contract), the addition of the variable accrual rate to the contract can
result in greater profits to the manufacturer compared to the addition of the fixed accrual
rate to the single participation rate contract. 
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